

PACIFIC RAILWAY,

CANADA.

BRITANNICUS LETTERS, &C., THEREON,


—BY—

M. MCLEOD.

"A momentous subject is now brought to the notice of the people of Great Britain—it ought not to be neglected, until, perhaps a voice from her Colonial children may go forth proclaiming 'it is too late'—for then, the opportunity of uniting, in firm and friendly bonds of union, 'this wondrous empire on which the solar orb never sets,' will have passed away for ever."—*Pamphlet by Major Robert Carmichael Smyth, R. E., 1849.*

"I hope to see, or at least that my children will see, a Railway, wholly on British territory from Atlantic to Pacific."—*Answer of Hon. Chief Justice Draper, as Special Commissioner of Canada, to the Commons of England, 1857.*

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PACIFIC RAILWAY, CANADA.

Selection from Series of Letters by "Britannicus"
(from 1869 to 1873) on the Subject,
WITH ADDITIONAL REMARKS.

PREFACE.

This little pamphlet may, especially to the Legislative mind more immediately appealed to, appear an obtrusion.

In the way of excuse (if called for), I have but to refer to its own pages in explanation of the position and act of the humble writer, in this matter of British Pacific Railway.

The subject, in its vital importance and extended bearings, is one which, I have ever felt, and now, more than ever, feel, should be taken up and dealt with—*duly* dealt with—by abler minds than myself, and in a manner worthy of the subject and the emergency.

As explained in my Britannicus letters of 1869, and in my work "Peace River", (of 1872), and also as appears from Mr. Fleming's Pacific Railway Survey Report of 1874 (page 13), it is to the accident of my special knowledge of the vast wilds to be traversed—wilds yet unshown by blue book or authentic record—that I have appeared in this connection.

If, in the course of my writing on the subject I have seemingly taken a part against any (so-called) "political party" of the day, I beg to say that such was not, and is not, my intent. I know no "political parties" of the day in Canada, save in this: On this Empire Field of Canada, I see two CAMPS—one BRITISH; the other, "AMERICAN." The former, disorganized by unsuspicion of danger; the latter, covertly most aggressive.

As to myself, let me say. A mere unit, humble—a "nobody"—in the four million mass of Canadians more immediately concerned, I, under Providence, arise in the new scene as but a "leather-stocking" guide (as it were) through the pathless forest to be traversed, to meet the lurking foe, and—as my brave old father and grandfather did—forward, westward, the path of empire in emprise boldly dare to cleave. Pioneers in adventure of the fur trade—keenly militant in its early struggles—the "Flag" in their case, but "*followed Trade*."

M. McLEOD.

AYLMER, Co. Ottawa, Q., 4th February, 1875.

NOTE.—The matter within brackets, in the following pages, is new, and, in most instances, is thus introduced to avoid the inconvenience of foot notes.—M. M.

PACIFIC RAILWAY, CANADA.

(The Ottawa Times, May 27, 1869.)

BRITISH RAILWAY TO THE PACIFIC— AN IMPERIAL NECESSITY.

LETTER I.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—“I hope to see, or, at least, that my children will see,” said Chief Justice Draper, before the Commons Committee of 1857, on the question of the “Hudson’s Bay Territories,” “a railway, wholly on British territory, from Atlantic to Pacific.” The answer was in bold and noble defiance to antagonistic interrogation on the part of the Hon. Edward Ellice and other Hudson’s Bay magnates on that great committee of twenty and two. Chief Justice Draper, as our delegate, was then fighting the battle of Canada in the enemy’s stronghold—an enemy that, most prudently, declined the gage, then and there (or, rather, nearly a month before) formally given by him, of a judicial test of their charter. The same body, or influence, tried, in earnest self-defence, to balk our high mandatory; but in vain. The report of that committee is one worthy of a British Parliament.

Ten years before that, another, of some authority, spoke, and earnestly wrote on the same theme, viz: British railway from Atlantic to Pacific. In 1849, Major (i. e., then Major, but subsequently of higher grade) Robert Carmichael Smyth wrote a book—a brochure of 68 pages—in which he thus discourses: “A momentous subject is now brought to the notice of the people of Great Britain—it ought not to be neglected, until, perhaps, a voice from her Colonial children may go forth proclaiming ‘It is too late’—for then, the opportunity of uniting, in firm and friendly bonds of union, ‘this wondrous empire on which the solar orb never sets,’ will have passed away for ever.”

Such was the heart-cry of a true British officer of the Royal Engineers, twenty years ago, when he had seen part, at least, of our grand land, and had returned to the

“Mother Isle.” The book is full, not of argument only, but of indisputable fact and proposition, always true, and given, as might be expected from such a mind, and one so trained, with almost the force of mathematical demonstration. No doubt some allowance is to be made for the inspiration (ever strong) of his *“compagnons de voyage”* (Haliburton and Howe) he so gratefully speaks of; but still they could only have lent a word, *con amore*, on the subject, and given their own thoughts and aspirations, approvingly on it, in chime with the old “Clockmaker” of 1838. As to the feasibility of such a railway, at a time when such works were of the level plain, and the iron horse had not yet dared the mountain leap, none but a strong and daring mind, and one master of its mystery—none, it may be said but a British (or *Americo-British*) civil engineer—one of that body of intellectual men who span the deep, and make straight the crooked, and smooth, the rugged places of the earth, would have so spoken; and, moreover, have written a book on the, to the world then, so wild a theme. Hear him! He speaks from purest philanthropy—not only for the conservation of British right, and power, and glory, but for the amelioration of her overcrowded, poor, and the happiness of her varied millions of our common humanity:

“Between the north-eastern and north-western shores of America, and through our loyal, long-tried and devoted American Colonies, there might,” says he, “be undertaken a great, a noble and a most important work, that would give remunerative employment to the population, to the wealth and to the inventive genius of England. Did his Grace,”—he is speaking of the Duke of Wellington as Premier in 1830, and when, with great foresight, he held to Oregon against American pretension, and thereby secured to us (notwithstanding the lamentable treaty, subsequently, of 1846) sufficient of the Pacific coast for a harbour—“Did his Grace,”

says he, "in short, look forward to a *grand national railway* from the Atlantic to the Pacific? If not, let his Grace" (N. B.—That was in 1848-49) "do so now!" "Let the people of Great Britain do so! Let her Colonial Minister, starting as it may at first appear. A little reflection will show that England and her children have the power to make it: that it *must* be done, and will become valuable property—for it would increase our commerce and trade to an extent not easy to calculate." And here he cites from *J. S. Mill, on political economy*: "Considering," says Mill, "all the natural and acquired advantages that we possess for this purpose, it should rather create surprise and regret that our commerce is so small, than engender pride that it is so large."

"We may conclude, then, that improvements in production and emigration of capital to the more fertile soils and unworked mines of the uninhabited or thinly peopled parts of the globe, do not, as it appears to a superficial view, diminish the gross produce and demand for labour at home; but, on the contrary, are what we have chiefly to depend on for the increasing of both, and are even the necessary conditions of any great or prolonged augmentations of either; nor is it any exaggeration to say that, within limits, the more capital a country like England expends in these two ways, the more she will have left." Then proceeds Major Smyth—"But such a noble work must not be looked upon merely as a money question; although, if only considered in that light, England must reflect, that if she wishes and intends to retain her high pre-eminence amongst the nations of the earth, she must, most assuredly, pay for it. No country can have all the blessings and advantages of England, and have them for nothing, nor can she retain them without great exertion. Her accumulated wealth can not be allowed to remain idle; nor will it. No one will deny for a moment that every economy that will make the poor man richer and happier ought to be practised; but let us take care that we do not, from too strong a desire to retain that wealth which Providence has thrown into the lap of England, even in the midst of war, deprive her labouring children of legitimate employment and just remuneration (all that the industrious classes of our fellow-countrymen require). But the undertaking proposed has even a higher claim to our attention. *It is the great link required to unite in one powerful chain the whole English race.*"

And so on, in intelligent and high patriotic appeal, he puts the case in all its phases, physical, political and social. And, further citing *Cobden*, he says:—"The exportation of labourers and capital from the old to the new countries, from a place where their productive power is less, to a place where it is greater, increases, by so much, the aggregate produce of the labour and capital of the world." And then, citing *Mill* again, he says:—"The question of Government intervention in the world of colonization involves the future and permanent interests of colonization itself, and far outstretches the comparatively narrow limits of purely economical considerations alone. The removal of population from the overcrowded to the unoccupied parts of the earth's surface is one of those works of eminent social usefulness which most require, and which, at the same time, will best repay, the intervention of Government. No individual or body of individuals could reimburse themselves for these expenses." "Government," continues Major Smyth, "on the contrary, could take from the increasing wealth caused by the construction of this Railway and consequent great emigration, the fraction which would suffice to repay with interest the money advanced."

Such, and such like citation and argument does the author earnestly and strongly advance on the subject. He proposes a "National Railway," from Halifax to the Pacific by the shortest line possible, which he estimates at 3,025 miles—the work to be begun simultaneously in different sections, and the convict labour of England, say 20,000, to be utilized at different points where local population may not be available. On this head, and as to feasibility, cost and immediate Imperial as well as Dominion necessity, more anon—in my next.

Your's,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, 25th May, 1869.

LETTERS 2 to 7, inclusive, give, in descriptive detail as to physical features,

heights and distances, a feasible line of route for railway from Montreal to Bella-coola, Pacific tide water at the head of the North Bentwick Arm, *via* Lake Nipissing (north side), Lake Nepigon (south side), Fire Steel river (summit source), Rat Portage (N. of Lake of the Woods), Stone Fort (head of sloop navigation of Lake Winnipeg—Red River), Yellow Head Pass, Quesnel Lake and River, Chilcotin Plateau, and the remarkable Gorge and Valley of Bella-coola, about 83 miles in length, and from $\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 miles in width through the Cascade range to Ocean.

All, with the exception of about 20 miles between the North Thompson river and the head waters (N. eastern) of Quesnel Lake, has been examined and reported on in Mr. Fleming's exhaustive, or, at least, almost exhaustive reports, and found to be correct, or approximately so, within margins of absolute determinations by instrumental measurement, so close, as to warrant assumption of my correctness in the main.

See Appendix, "Pacific Railway Routes."

Ottawa Times, about 27th June, 1869.

A BRITISH PACIFIC RAILWAY—AN IMPERIAL NECESSITY.

LETTER 8.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—The following is a summary of the sections treated of:—

| Terminal Points. | Length in Miles. | Cost per Mile. | Total. |
|--|------------------|----------------|-------------|
| Montreal to Ottawa City, <i>via</i> Vaudreuil..... | 105 | \$25,000 | \$2,625,000 |
| Ottawa to summit between Nipissing and Ottawa R.... | 190 | 30,000 | 5,700,000 |
| Nipissing L. to Michipicoton River | 320 | 35,000 | 11,120,000 |
| Michip. R. to Fire Steel River..... | 310 | 40,000 | 12,400,000 |
| Fire Steel R. to Selkirk (Red River) Settlement..... | 340 | 35,000 | 11,900,000 |
| Selkirk to Edmonton..... | 750 | 20,000 | 15,000,000 |
| Edmonton to Milton Pass (Leather or Yellow Head)... | 250 | 35,000 | 7,500,000 |

Milton Pass to Bella

coola..... 400 \$60,000 \$24,000,000

2,663

\$90,245,000

Say..... \$100,000,000

These distances and estimates are entirely on my own calculation, and were made long before the publication of Mr. Russell's work. Mr. Russell's is an admirable work, well and faithfully put together, so far as I can judge from a glance at it, for it has only within the last few hours come to my hand. I am glad to see that his projective line of railway from Michipicoton River to Fort Garry agrees with mine—or mine with his. The rest of his line, *viz.*, from Ottawa city up Montreal river to near the height of land in the direction of James's Bay is, I think, a detour which may be avoided; I take the southern flank of an uprise of which he takes the northern.

The line I propose from Montreal to Bella-coola (Pacific tide water) is the most direct, shortest, easiest, and in every respect the best possible, from sea port to sea port, north of Mexico. Its leading points, determining it, are the north shore of Nipissing, the south one of Neepigon, the north one of the Lake of the Woods, the Milton Pass, and, finally, that Pacific water-gate, the remarkable gorge of Bella-coola. No tunneling is necessary; and, if at all, only some ten miles of snow cover. The only bridging of any extent will be that across the two branches of the Saskatchewan; unless, as may, most wisely (for fuel and safety from the "Plain Indians)," be done, the line be slightly diverted, so as to strike the main Saskatchewan below the "forks," and follow the north shed of the N.—the woody—branch of that noble stream.

The Fraser River presents less difficulty. The most formidable obstacle to an Atlantic and Pacific Railway through British territory was, undoubtedly, the bridging of the St. Lawrence. That ("eighth wonder") has, by the genius and talent of a Keefer (Thomas C.) C. E. of Canada, who first personally gauged the problem, and by his elaborate and thoroughly practical plans and specifications for the purpose won the faith of even Stephenson of England, been overcome. And so, I feel assured, will it ever be with every seeming difficulty in the way. There is native skill and practical ability in the country to cope with every

physical obstacle incident to the special physical character and climatic agencies of Northern America.

However, as it must, essentially, be an English road—the sole international *British* highway across this Continent; one for all human time, it must be laid as such, at any necessary cost. More than half a century ago, England spent, in war alone, one hundred and fifty million pounds sterling, (£150,000,000) in a single year! and within twenty years, over three thousand millions of dollars in a fight alone!! She has tripled her wealth since; and commensurately stand her responsibilities to human progress in the comity of nations; for, “to whom much is given, of him much shall be required.” “So the notes ring”—ever ring, ever ring.

Before proceeding, however, to the consideration of “ways and means” on which, by the way, I shall say as little as possible at present, for until thorough exploration *ad hoc* be had, all estimate must, to some degree, be necessarily arbitrary—let us take a glance at the relative merits and demerits of the route proposed with the American one now established, and also, so far as may be, with the others in progress.

1. From sea port to sea port, the Britannia Railway Line, as proposed, is nearest to air line between mid-England and mid-Japan and China, is shorter, by more than eight hundred miles than the present one from New York to San Francisco, or than any possible line of railway from Atlantic to Pacific, across United States territory.

2. Liverpool, Milton Pass, Cariboo Centre, and Bellaçoola are on the same line of latitude, viz.: 53° degrees N. or nearly so; not varying thirty minutes: and Nankin (mid-China) and Jeddo (mid-Japan) are nearly on the same isothermal line.

3. The altitude of the Britannia summit is less, by one-half, than that of the present “American” one; or, I believe, than any American one that may be hereafter tried.

Moreover, from that fact, the latter, though further South, will ever have more snow and mountain storm to contend with, than the comparatively low and ever sheltered British line, with its mile breadth (or two) of wood (a fuel preserve) all along, save, of course, in the open prairie, where unwooded.

4. The Britannia line has every material and element necessary for construction,

maintenance, and working in exhaustless abundance along its whole length; for even in the prairie to be traversed, the line verging on the wood lands, touches out growths here and there, and local supply of fuel is assured throughout.

On part of the route, viz.: between the N. Saskatchewan water shed to near the Milton Pass, coal, highly bituminous, and supposed to be fit for locomotive fuel, is abundant—cropping out on the river banks near the surface, and showing strata of from fifteen to twenty feet in thickness.

The American line, on the other hand, is totally destitute of coal, and even of wood through half its length, and even of water in the alkaline desert wastes, extending over spaces varying from one hundred and fifty miles downwards, throughout the high plateaux traversed by it.

5. The American line, for about one thousand miles, is on Indian battle ground, with Indian hostility, the fiercest—for the Indian of the Northern American plain is born, and lives, and dies in fight—besetting the way, while, on the other hand, the British line is entirely free from such molestation.

6. The extreme and sudden vicissitudes of climate on the American route, especially from the hot valleys of California to the immediate snow heights of Nevada (“snow range”) forbid, in a measure, pleasure travel; whereas the equable Northern one, by which one might travel from Pekin to London in the same garments, would, in this respect, attract it.

That in point of scenery, the British offers, infinitely, more pleasing features, and that, even in winter; the route being largely pine-clad.

7. From mid-China and Japan to New York is over one thousand miles shorter *via* Bellaçoola and Montreal, than by San Francisco.

8. From England to Australia the British line is over one thousand miles shorter than by any possible American one; and to China is from two to three thousand miles shorter, according to port to be reached.

9. The American road is, it is authentically reported, of cheap and hurried construction and scarcely safe.

[Note.—January, 1875—Even yet the Government of the United States, it is reported in the American Press, hesitates to

accept much of the work, as being insufficient, in construction, for the land subsidy.]

The Britannia would, of course, be a thorough English road; substantial, well appointed, and offering every security and efficiency.

Such are some of the relative excellences of the British road and route.

The next point I would touch on is as to "ways and means," to provide not only the \$100,000,000 aforesaid for construction, but for the running of the road, a cost, probably, of nearly ten millions of dollars per annum, in the case of a large traffic. The magnitude of the cost necessary, is a ground of Imperial assumption, in considerable part, in measure, at least, of obvious imperial interest in the matter. On this point, Mr. Editor, I hold a very strong opinion.

The gigantic task is beyond the power of this nascent Dominion. Already its debt is considerable, and it has yet much to expend, and that, forthwith, in the establishment of *internal* means of development, and more especially in the opening and utilization of her water ways. Her staple products are of a nature to call for the *cheapest* transport. Why should the produce of the Far West be subjected to railway rates, high and destructive of its legitimate commerce? It wants outlet—canals and economic navigation—life channels.

But neither for these, nor for railways, nor for any object whatever, let there be *Land grants*, I would say. Land—our "mother earth"—is for cultivation; not for speculation in the marts of Mammon. We have had enough of that already.

The wild is the heritage of every son of Adam who, by the law of his nature, first seeks to till it. By the "sweat of his brow" he consecrates it as *his*, and as *his*, *his nation's*. 'Tis thus that British freemen in America live, and alone *can* live. Every man is, in a sense, his own sovereign in this free, broad, uncastled land of ours. No "lordship" is sufferable with us. As is our God-given "free-will," so, with co-ordinate responsibility do we desire to live. In this, as proved, is the cure, the specific for all political discontent, disloyalty or even Fenianism itself. The Irishmen of Canada—freeholders—resisted, to a man, every attempt to tamper with their loyalty. All in our untrammelled

workfield are loyal. Even with the savage of the wild, the "King George man" as he, with child-like confidence, calls himself, loyalty to the British Crown has the force of an instinct—is a holy thing with him. Touch it not! Foster it, I would say to England; and no less so to her young fiduciary, the Dominion of Canada. People the fertile waste with husbandmen—freehold husbandmen—FREE LAND GRANTS—MUNICIPAL INSTITUTIONS, of Upper Canadian mould—A FREE POLL—A FREE PARLIAMENT—These are the bases we desire to build on—build on, into nationhood; and so, under Providence, will it be, else faith deceives.

But, to take up the last head of our subject. The Roman of old, when he conquered a country, bound his spoil with a Road—a "military road"—till, at last, he had one three thousand miles in length. It was so with the ancient Peruvian; it is so with modern Russia; it is so with all national powers; concentration, i. e., the power thereof, is the measure of military force; for that, the rail is supreme. What, without the precious "bit" of railroad through the sloughs of Balaclava gorge, would have availed all the might of England against Sebastopol? "Stuck in a mud-hole!" Ignoble verdict!

The RAIL is the sceptre, as well as the plough and sword of the day. By it alone can national power hold its own, or even rule its own internally. In this sense—in both senses—it is an imperial necessity in all countries. The proposition requires no special illustration; it is obvious everywhere. It is on this political axiom that every civilized country, of every physical aspect—on the heights of the Swiss, as on the flats of the Dutch; on the steppes of Russia, as on the apices of Spain and Italy the rail runs and rules as a dominant reality.

But the cost, say some. What of that? I answer thus: Suppose that not a ton of freight, not a single passenger on pleasure or business, nought but mails, guns and ammunition, and navy and army stores should pass over that road, it would pay; at least, there is reason to believe it would. A saving of *one-tenth* in navy and army expenditure would yield, even now, \$7,000,000 (seven millions of dollars) per annum. Mail service would yield, say, one million. Four millions of dollars per annum would

run the road for such limited purposes, leaving, for interest on cost, four per centum per annum.

But sir, the question, the great and main question involved is, in fact, that of motor of nearly ten millions of tons (I predicate on the figures of Dr. Cullen—a British authority—to the Society of Engineers in England) ten millions of tons per annum of the most precious of earth's produce, in commerce, from furthest East to furthest West, and throughout the whole world of human industry.

[On this subject of general transport in the line in question, see "Financial Basis."]

One-tenth of that, at only two-thirds of current railway rates, viz.: two cents instead of three cents per ton per mile, would yield fifty-three millions of dollars per annum. Fifty passengers a day, each way, at, say \$100—half of the American first-class rates—would yield over three millions of dollars a year. But we may, for the second or third years of function double that item, and ever afterwards more than treble it; for the Mandarin of China, the Taja of Japan, rich, intelligent, and, at last, new awakened as from a long, long sleep, eager to see, and realize their dreams of the world and the hitherto hidden wonders thereof; yea, the essentially commercial masses of the Chinese and Japanese proper—the latter, to a man, all readers and writers, and of a most sprightly intelligence and social disposition. Yea, half the globe itself, and that the most active part, will seek travel; are, in fact, on the move already, and settling wherever, dove-like, they can find a resting place in the moving world of waters. Look at that East at the present moment! It is the burst of incubation, intellectual, of half a world. The débacle of forty centuries, or more, of their frost in the human cycle. The American—shrewd—sees it, and hence the triple effort—when even prostrated by war—at all cost—cost of almost all his available lands for cultivation, viz., one hundred millions of acres, or nearly so, and, for one road alone, over one hundred millions of dollars in Government bonds, besides the land grant—and seeing the coming flood of wealth and power endeavours thus to catch it, direct it, and secure it. Yes, Mr. Editor, on this score of travel alone, within the next ten years, we may, for the nonce, calculate on at least ten millions a year.

Add all that. It is over seventy millions. Call it seventy. Halve it. It will pay over working cost, twenty-five per cent. Quarter it. It will pay ten per cent.

[NOTE.—These estimates have been fully borne out by the traffic returns since of the American Pacific Railway (Union and Central), which, during the last four years—so far as can be gathered from press reports—amount to about fifty million dollars.

In connection with the railway, a new (subsidized) Pacific Steamship Line for the China and Japan trade has just been organized, with a capital of \$10,000,000, all subscribed, principally, in California.]

But, it will be said, these are mere wild estimates—arbitrary. Granted that they are to some degree. They are so from the nature of the case—one *sui generis*—a problem of vast elements, unparallelled, and with quantities somewhat indefinite, factors necessarily somewhat arbitrary. Still we have some authenticated statistics to go on—and I have read them most-carefully in our Imperial blue book. The logic of arithmetic is unanswerable—irresistible. But even did it fail us entirely. Is all political movement, every national act, for present or future good to be determined by a simple rule of arithmetic? If so, then truly indeed, are we "but a nation of shopkeepers," and foolish at that. No! It is not so. Thank God! England is mistress of the seas—of the highways, heaven laid, of human intercourse and progress. For human good we, of her, believe her to be so; and so, we believe, she under Providence, will ever be, till time be no more. Her ocean throne is, at the present moment, by cunning accident, riven it is true—riven by a foreign iron-rod suddenly struck. It is for her to counteract that, and, more firmly to weld her seat of power. True also, that at present, prospectively in menace, if not actually, that the *short ways*, the opening highways of the earth, viz., the Isthmus of Suez, and that of Darien, are, virtually in foreign, rival hands, and that to her are left but the old roundabouts the "Capo" and the "Horn," but that also, by the same means, she can fully meet and remedy. Before her, inviting, she has, against all these, a save-all, a guard-all, a defy-all. In the gorge for railway—Bel-lacoola—port-hole to the Pacific—gunned and charged direct from her inexhaustible

arsenals at home, she has a thing of superlative power. It lies before her. Her destiny is there. *There, her NECESSITY.*

Yours, &c.,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, June 24, 1869.

(Canadensis.)

Ottawa Times, about 3rd July, 1869.

NOTE.—The Editor, in a very able article, embodying what might be considered the main arguments advanced for the principle of Land Grants for public works, had taken issue with me as to what I said on the subject. Unfortunately, I have no copy of the article, and must refer the enquirer, as to it, to the parliamentary or other public files of the paper.

RAILWAY LAND GRANTS.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—I am glad to see your remarks in exception to what I advance, as to the impolicy of extensive land grants to any railway company, or other enterprise by any incorporated body, or company of private individuals. The question is an imminent one; and it is well it should now be discussed. However, it is not for me—who, as you are aware, am not of the arenas of public discussion in such matters—to assume the lead in it; and, moreover, professional duties (somewhat in arrear) render it utterly impossible for me, at present, to bend myself to the task, or to meet you as I should; and I can only pray that the press, here and elsewhere, may take up the question, and give it fair dealing.

The side you have taken has, of course, its "arguments;" but, to my mind (from natural defect, of course) it is, to reciprocate a term—"very inconclusive." In other words, we are both sincere, very earnest, very enthusiastic, perhaps, and therefore, somewhat blind to each other's particular merits on the other side. This is natural, and gives no ground for complaint. We view the matter from different stand points. I speak as one of the soil; and with a paramount, a nostalgic desire for the establishment of a Government there, under the British flag, of the utmost civil liberty; untrammelled by any of those *imperia* in

imperio created by such land grants. True, you say that "my argument is very inconclusive," inasmuch as "I cannot show that 'our British constitution' has been imperilled by a grant of wild lands for the promotion of any public enterprise." How could I? There has been no case in point throughout the whole British realm. Canada, in her general policy, has refused such grants, as to Upper Canada. Millions of acres of wild lands in Lower Canada have, it is true, in a way, but ever most reluctantly, and on very special grounds, been promised conditionally for certain railway enterprises; none of which, however, were carried out, nor, in fact, effectually begun. Not a single rail of railway has been laid in virtue of any such grants.

There is an instinct, it seems to me, in the British heart, which repugns such policy on British ground; a something stronger, purer, and wiser than a Provincial Parliament hard pressed, with its play of party, and internal *gicets à pens* (stand and deliver). But it is not for me to give good and sufficient reasons for such uniform failure, nor to probe the esoteric thereof. The fact is significant. But if the contrary had been the case; and that those millions of acres had passed into the hands of these railway companies, it would not have raised that danger, which I deprecate, as to the entirely new land in question. The North Shore Railway Company, of Quebec, and the "St. Maurice Railway and Navigation Company," and all such "land granted," or rather land promised corporations, might have taken all, and still have been no appreciable power, no disturbing element in the Government of the country. They could not, by landed railway navvies, sweep more than a few polls, along their line of privilege; they could not have carried out any *class* legislation in furtherance of their own special interests—unless, in case of dead lock of parties, as an "Irish brigade" in the House; they would, in fact, be comparatively harmless in the bulk of other general countervailing interests in the country. As to a country *wholly new*, like the Northwest Territories, where the very rudiments of the social fabric have yet to be made and laid, the case is very different. The former was, for the nonce and the hour, a mere supervenience. The latter is the creation of a lasting reality, a people; mayhap a nation. Such a propri-

etary as that proposed would, at the very outset, hold the country in its grasp, and keep its most fertile parts a waste, till prices should rise; would be a combination of capital whose sole principle would be the reproduction of itself—such is its law—at any and every sacrifice of individual interest, or public interest, save its own. The experiment would, I fear, be fatal to British connection, in those borders; and a cruel one to those whose lot might be cast there, at the mercy of such a body—soul-less and money-mad.

The principle is not a British one—at least not yet—nor do I believe will it ever be so. It is an American one—of *Dollar-dom*—of most recent inception; and, even there, yet to be tried and tested in its results; the fruition has yet to come.

I have no personal knowledge of the general character of the cast of votes in the Illinois elections since it became a railway State. But there is this to be said of it, viz., that there the scheme was new and had to win its way into public favour; and there is this more to be said of it, viz., that after the railway in question its land became the dearest in the whole United States—such, at least, has ever been my impression.

It will be interesting to see the immediate result, in the political chess-board, of the late Pacific Railway land grants. On this point there can only be conjecture—so we leave it, for the present. It is only recently that railways, “Pacific railways,” have become, it would appear, the dominant interest in the political economy of the United States. With them, as we can readily understand, the matter was one of vital necessity, and powerless, otherwise, to raise the means to accomplish the national aim, they gave lands. It was, with them, in their utter prostration of financial resources, a supreme necessity. It is not so with England. She has money to spare to lend by the millions to Russia, to make railways to her precious coveted East; and to another, but a different Sebastopol.

The fundamental principle on which I take my stand is the *inalienability* of the public domain, save for a “manifest public advantage, or in case of pressing necessity”—these are the words of Vattel. That domain (*dominium directum*), though nominally in the “Crown” is the property of the Nation, not only for the day, but

for *all time* in the prospective existence of that nation. The holding, by Crown or Government, is in *trust*—in administration, for national life only. The proposition opens a large question, but I cannot, in present limits, enter into it.

In the present instance there is, it is true, some degree of manifest public advantage, but it is outweighed by the inevitable evil deprecated. Certainly there is no “pressing necessity” for such an alienation.

I say there is *no necessity*; for the country could be developed without the railway in question. The present effort for opening the British water route, with connecting roadways from Lake Superior, is in the right direction; it will give outflow from the foot of the Rocky Mountains. It will, I believe, under any circumstances, become the main commercial channel of the products of the country. Passenger and light freight traffic will probably seek the American ways.

In this there is danger to the continuance of British connection. The mere gravity of commerce, self-interest and magnetism of association will naturally force the new people into national association. That tendency—“drift”—can only be counteracted by a British railway, a national highway, the work of the nation, and not of its youngest progeny. In this, I hold, is there an Imperial necessity for Britain to make her road from the Atlantic to the Pacific, for her own special interests, not only in America, but the world over. It is not for us, poor struggling colonists, with poor servitude, to build roads and give of our own, in crushing measure, besides imposing debt on posterity merely to enrich still more the England that, in very plethora of wealth, lends to her enemies, her greatest, bitterest and most dangerous. Loyalty is a contract of mutual right and duty. We will, as ever, do our duty to her; but she must do her's. In all loyalty I say this. But to return to the more immediate argument with you, Mr. Editor.

You say “a railway or a canal, or a macadamised road adds a certain ascertainable value to every acre of wild land contiguous to it; and whether the Government of the country or a company of private individuals adds to this value, they

have an undoubted right to be remunerated for it."

Unquestionably so—*remunerated—fairly*. remunerated, but no more; all beyond is wrong. But I am sorry I must stop here to catch the mail. I would have replied sooner, but, being absent, yours has only just come to hand.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

June 30, 1869.

The Editor having, with a candour which commends itself, yielded in some measure to my argument, proposed, in lieu, a system of *hypothecation* of the lands in question, for the object in view—to which I conceded, in the following terms:

RAILWAY LAND GRANTS.

To the Editor of the Times.

SIR,—Allow me, in final reply, to thank you for the liberality of your columns to "Britannicus," and to apologize to your readers for trespassing on their kind indulgence. As to the proposition with which you close, viz.: the mere *hypothecation* of a certain extent of the domain more immediately benefited, and the establishment of a sinking fund to meet debentures, I heartily agree with you. It would, in my humble opinion, be an admirable compromise; provided an imperial guarantee or subsidy, or both, in some approximate measure to national interest in the work as a through line, be also had.

We have all, evidently, a common aim, viz.; the realization, speedily, wisely and effectually, of our Dominion. In this all parties are one. In this there is every hope—every gratulation. With Union we may do much; without it we may wholly fail.

Yours, &c.,

BRITANNICUS.

OTTAWA, July 6, 1869.

(The Ottawa Times, Thursday, July 8, 1869.)

REPLY BY EDITOR.

We have this morning a few lines from our correspondent, "Britannicus," closing up the discussion on the "Railway Land

Grants." Our readers are much indebted to him for the valuable information he has given concerning the great Pacific Railway project; and we are glad to find that, while he is still, no doubt, as sternly as ever opposed to granting lands to private companies, he endorses our suggestion that the Government might raise the money by debentures, hypothecating a portion of the public lands as an additional security, over the general credit of the country, for their redemption.

There is certainly a wide difference between this proposition and that of a large land grant to a private company, and we are not surprised that our correspondent should approve the one while condemning the other. The main object in view is to secure the railway, and we think that the land might be utilized for this purpose, either in the one way, or the other; though, for ourselves, we should much prefer that the road were to be built by the Government, as thereby excellence of construction would be better guaranteed, and the management of the Crown domain set apart towards defraying the cost would be regulated with the view to promote settlement rather than to realize a large amount of money. At all events, the cry of "land monopoly" and all danger of monopoly would be avoided, which is no small recommendation in favour of the course we have proposed.

It would certainly be gratifying could the Imperial guarantee be obtained for the Pacific Railway debentures. It would be useless to ask a subsidy, because the British Parliament would scout the idea. The prevailing sentiment in Britain, on the connection with Canada, would have to be radically upset before this could be hoped for. But a request for the Imperial guarantee might fairly be pressed. The amount for which it should be asked need not be more than ten times that of the Intercolonial guaranteed loan; and the advantages the Pacific road would confer upon the Empire would be twenty times as great as those to be derived from the Intercolonial. Indeed, it is only as part of the trans-continental project that the Intercolonial can fairly be said to have any great Imperial importance, because it is only by extending Canada from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and strengthening its population and commerce, that its perma-

ment importance to the Empire can now, in the altered state of affairs, be guaranteed. To connect Quebec and Halifax by railway was a grand project thirty years ago; to-day it is but forging a link in the chain which must span the Continent; and as England has guaranteed some fifty or sixty millions sterling for railways in India, of the value of which she is already fully convinced by experience, it would not seem an unreasonable demand to ask for a guarantee of half the amount to Canada, for a railway that would contribute so much to the advantage of British commerce.

In any case we hold, as the *Montreal Gazette* said the other day, that "the land must build the railway." If with the Imperial guarantee so much the better; if without it still the land is able to bear the burthen, or such portion of it as the railway itself could not repay. It is seemingly a serious obligation to undertake a fresh financial obligation equal perhaps to twenty cents per acre of all the real valuable lands of the Northwest Territory. But it should be remembered that at the outside, not more than ten millions of dollars would, or should, be expended yearly, the true policy being to open the road from the settled portion of the Dominion; through the wilderness, and to promote settlement along the route as the work progresses. After the very first year, there would be a direct return to the outlay; because lands could be sold, and no doubt would be readily taken up, at reasonable prices, according to their value and situation. The indirect benefit of such an outlay would tell immediately on the commerce of the country and the public revenue. Such a sum of money, added to the trading capital of the country year by year, with the large influx of population, which would concurrently take place, would give unwonted prosperity, and so increase the revenue by existing means and rates of taxation, that with the sale of the lands, and the appropriation of the money to the redemption of the railway debt, there need be no sensible addition to the people's burthens.

This grand scheme necessarily partakes of the character of a venturesome speculation. To be successful it would require to be pushed with energy, honesty and intelligence. The fostering of immigration

would be an indispensable condition of its success, and the bending of the whole national effort to the accomplishment of this particular and would involve the practice of rigid prudence and economy in every other direction. To incur even a portion of the debt and delay the pushing forward of the road, at the points most available for immediate settlement, would be to court disaster and defeat. But with intelligent management and by proceeding cautiously at first, there is every probability in the entire success of such a project, if the Government had, as we said before, "the dash and courage" to take it in hand, and the people the faith to sustain them in the work.

X

FINANCIAL BASIS.

NORTH WEST LANDS—VALUE—IMMIGRATION
—TRAFFIC, &c.

LETTER III.

To the Editor of the *Gazette*.

SIR,—In my last, I concluded with an incidental allusion to the *imperial* considerations which invest this subject. Four and a half years ago, in other columns in our metropolitan press, under the caption, "A British Pacific Railway—an Imperial Necessity," I laid down my humble views of the subject, in a manner to call forth, at least, editorial recognition, but with the remark—a true one—that it would require much to move England to the work. It has required much, and requires much more still. The scheme, thanks to Sir Hugh Allan and those who moved in the matter with him, has been on "Change," and, on its merits, practically received, though, for the moment, placed in abeyance. Sufficient at least has been accorded to it to inspire hope in England's "money bags." But to proceed to state my proposition briefly.

The work in question is not only a commercial, but *quoad* British national interests, is a military—an *imperial* necessity; certainly as much so as the Intercolonial Railway. It should therefore be constructed on the same principle, and in like manner, without land grants, and solely on the financial resources of the power or powers immediately concerned. I say "without land grant," because—

1. The land in question, as I understand British government, though nominally "Crown Domain," is held but in *administrative* duty and in *national trust*: trust, not for alienation in mass to parties—foreign persons or bodies corporate mayhap, but for the settlement of British subjects in the manner most conducive to national purposes.

2. All experience in British North America, and if I mistake not, in Australia, has proved, that large land grants to companies of capitalists are obstructive to speedy extension of settlement. The Plutocracy who invest in such "fancy stocks" ever, naturally, wait for a "rise," until rudely forced to give way by some such motor as a sale for Municipal Taxes—a motor itself the creature of settlement.

3. The creation, artificially, of a large and predominating class interest, and that, more particularly of a landed proprietary, is antagonistic to that individual liberty, which is the inherent right of citizenship in the new great land Columbus found, and on which the British flag waves with no diminished freedom.

4. The cost of the work in question, say, even \$120,000,000, or more, is within the financial resources, without risk or strain, of Canada or Britain, and even of Canada alone; with Britain's guarantee, in whole or in part, *pro forma*.

How? it will be asked. Thus—I answer.

For basis of operations, Canada, in her North West territories, and in British Columbia, as per agreement, *ad hoc*, has fully half a million of square miles (332,000,000) acres of lands* of large economic value, an area requiring but a railway to give current, life, and development to its boundless treasures. The moment such highway is made, every acre will average five dollars in value, and in five years after, double that, say \$3,000,000,000 (three thousand million dollars), and more, for the coal measures, vast and good, are beyond estimate. Such heritage—heritage of future as well as of the present generation, is for settlement in due course, by a proper system of immigration under governmental control and its immediate superintendence,

as an important function proper to our new Dominion.

On this land, for its improvement, I would propose an *hypothecation* for payment of Dominion debentures carrying 6 per cent interest, and 2 per cent for sinking fund, per annum, and running twenty-five years. From what I know, personally, of the land and its value, I feel assured, that after the first year or two of the commencement of the work, land sales would amply pay such interest and per centage of sinking fund.

The Imperial Government could not fairly refuse to give its guarantee, at least in some fair measure, to Dominion debentures for such a work.

Yours,

A BRITISH AMERICAN,

(M. McLEOD.)

December 26, 1873.

(*Montreal Gazette*, Jan. 1874.)

LETTER IV.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—One point more, and I shall close this intrusion on your generous columns.

But first, in supplement to what I advanced in my last as to hypothecation for railway debt, I would, to the lands (*i. e.*, wheat and pasture lands, with their invaluable coal measures and other mineral wealth) add the *Railway* itself, from its initiation, and as finished, in section after section, as a subject for mortgage; the Winnipeg and Pembina and Neepigon or Thunder Bay branches to be considered as integral parts of the main line. Such security ought to be beyond all cavil.

As to the time proposed for payment of principal, viz., twenty-five years, it has struck me since writing that, inasmuch as the next and the following generations will benefit most from the work, it would be but just to the present to leave to such beneficiaries the payment of the bulk of such principal, in so far as that can be done by debentures running beyond twenty-five years, say from thirty to forty years, and with, of course, a corresponding diminution of per centage for sinking fund.

***VALUE OF LANDS.**—The details of my estimates of economic areas in our North West Territories, "Rupert's Land" and British Columbia are given, in geographic designation, under the heads "North West Territories" and "British Columbia," in "*Lovell's Gazetteer of British North America*,"—a work published about a year ago. The same information, but in more extended terms, and with abundant reference to the

sources of information on the subject," viz., the journals, reports, &c., of my father, and other partners and co-venturers of the Hudson's Bay Company, and correspondence from all quarters of the Hudson's Bay Company's Territories with my father, when in charge of central and important posts, is given in the appendix to my work of spring, 1872, "*Peace River*," published in Ottawa. Besides all this, I could and do speak

The annual amount required, if the work has to be done within seven years, would (on each of such annual instalments, supposing them equal), be only about a million and a half of dollars per annum—only three times as much as the comparatively little, old and exhausted Province of Quebec has just realized out of her "Crown Lands" during the last year. Dominion Crown Land sales may, in two years after the commencement of our Pacific Railway, be ten-fold—certainly five-fold—that amount. But to come to my last point.

IMMIGRATION.

On this head, under the very special circumstances of the case, it is impossible to advance ought but predicate—which, of course, might be objected to as matter for "financial basis." Still, we have, in the recorded flow of this gulf stream of humanity to our ever hopeful shores, "something to go by," even for financial estimate." In that way a minimum, or even a fair medium, may be struck, as to determined results. But that does not, and cannot in effect meet our case—the problem before us of an abnormal, and, probably, super-excited migration of peoples, in considerable masses, from Europe and Asia. Manitoba, of the moment, even though unroaded, isolated, and to general emigration comparatively inaccessible, is evidence of this. Her Winnipeg of 1870—a hamlet of 300—is now a city of 5,000. What will the in-pour of immigration, from East, West and South be when the gates of ready access, by steam ways, are opened? No one can say with certainty; and speculation, on the factors and incidents of the hour before it, on this theme, may well start at its own shadow—its own honest forecast.

It has been calculated that every immigrant to North America, is, on average, worth \$1,000 to the State, whose revenue and natural resources and general national development, he contributes to. At that rate, one year's immigration, after our Pacific Railway shall be fairly under way in construction, might, in a sense, pay the total cash cost of the work. However, it would, probably, scarcely be advisable to assume so much in argument for "financial basis." I do so, rather in support of what, I think, would, *indirectly*, but in no small measure, contribute to "financial basis," viz., a liberal apportionment of fairly economic lands—good farming lands, grazing and agricultural—for *Free Land Grants*, along our first highways—say, river ways, and inland "territorial roads" (central), and also along the line of Pacific Railway proposed. Free Grantees, to better themselves, are apt to buy "sale lands." There will, moreover, be ample left, for sale, for settlement, in regular course. And in the proceeds of such, with that of the various city, town and village lots, to be laid off by Government, and in the proceeds from our valuable coal lands—which, by the way, appears by one of his Acts of Parliament of last session, the Hon. Mr. McKenzie seems so anxious to throw away for comparatively nothing, to wit, "one dollar an acre," to anybody that will buy them—there will, I presume, be abundant to pay interest and sinking fund on railway cost, and that, without the sale or grant of a single acre of the Crown, the peoples' domain, to the railway company, save the strip, and perhaps adjoining wood lots (for fuel, ties, and road maintenance) along their narrow line-way of rail.

As to any plan of immigration, I have, in remarks in my pamphlet, entitled

from personal knowledge of most of the vast region in question. All exploration and report of travel since in those "Wild North Lands," such as the report, full, faithful and exhaustive of Professor Macoun, the botanist (from Belleville) engaged by Mr. Sandford Fleming to examine and report on the flora and agricultural resources of our North West, from the shores of Lake Superior to the Pacific prove this. He and his companion (Mr. Horetzky) "speak," as Mr. Fleming states in his official report of 1874, "in glowing terms respecting the beauty of the country, the fertility of the soil, and the salubrity of the climate over wide areas on the eastern side of the Mountain Zone." When the travellers got on the western side winter had set in, but there was nothing found by them to indicate a less favorable flora, in the same latitudes, on the western side of the Rocky Mountains.

Captain Butler, in his admirable book of travel, "The Wild North Land," writing in 1873, says (page 258), "It will yet be found that there are ten acres of fertile land lying south of the North Saskatchewan for every one acre lying south of it." On this subject of fertility, extent and intrinsic value of lands offered in grant for the railway, there was no difficulty

in floating the scheme on the London Money Market. I hold evidence of the fact in the private correspondence to myself, from that quarter, in reference to the special information given in my writings on that subject, and the correctness of which it was ever in the power of capitalists in London to check, by reference to the official reports, charts and other archived internal information on the subject of the Hudson's Bay Company, in their chief office in London. That Company now comprises about or over two thousand stockholders, and probably embraces a very large majority of "Dealers on London Change." Be that as it may—the men with the necessary millions to make the road were satisfied with the consideration presented, in the Free Land Grant, irrespective of trade speculations, and were ready at once to make the necessary advances—as the Hon. Mr. Abbott stated when examined on the Royal Commission, *ad hoc*, it was only owing to the sudden distrust (inspired by agencies opposed to the work) as to the ability of the Government (Dominion) of the day to continue to hold its political power, in face of the combination against it—combinations avowedly to defeat the project as then laid—that they failed to succeed.

"Peace River," with its map, with yellow lines indicating what I would consider the best routes to adopt for "territorial roads," assumed that the subject is of such primary importance to the Dominion, that it had better be left to the control, entirely, even in working detail, of the Government. Unfortunately (but perhaps unavoidably) Provincial co-operation is now invoked. The experiment may succeed. It is to be hoped it will. But there will always this to be said of it. That for *financial* considerations, the entire control of a general scheme of immigration, in the hands of the Dominion Government, free from any possible disturbing element in the shape of Provincial jealousy or antagonism, would inspire more confidence, in the money market, than a divided or *quasi* divided holding by the various Governments.

On this subject, if, as may be the case, there be a clash of interests between the Dominion and Provincial Governments, on the face of the Union Act of B. N. A. it should, in its importance to all interests involved, viz., Imperial, as well as Dominion and Provincial, be rectified, and permanent remedy be at once established by Imperial Act of Parliament.

The object to be more immediately sought in this direction is, that the emigrant from any land, foreign or "home," shall feel assured, when he buys his ticket for Canada settlement, that he has a *national* guarantee for what it contracts, on its face, viz., assured transit, and choice, on view, of available settlement land.

BRITISH (IMPERIAL) TRADE RETURNS.

(Last—A.D. 1873.)

CHINA, exclusive of Hong Kong and Macao—
Page 263.

Imports from .. £12,454,234 stg.
Exports (United Kingdom) to. 4,982,701 "
" (Foreign and Colonial). 5,017,334 "

£22,354,269 " say \$111,771,345

CHINA, including Hong Kong and Macao.

Imports from .. £13,303,117 stg.
Exports (U. K.) 8,294,669 "
" (F. & C.) 8,627,599 "

£30,225,385 " say \$151,126,975

HONG KONG—Pages 257-8.

Imports from .. £ 783,457 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 2,411,968 "

" (F. & C.) .. 3,610,265 "

£7,805,390 " say \$39,026,950

JAPAN.

Imports from .. £ 5,611,310 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 1,680,917 "

" (F. & C.) .. 1,884,145 "

£9,175,502 " say \$45,877,500

ISLANDS IN THE PACIFIC.

Imports .. £ 47,492 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 23,716 "

" (F. & C.) 101,317 "

£172,525 " say \$861,625

STRAITS SETTLEMENTS—Pages 257-8.

Imports from .. £3,461,279 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 2,101,221 "

" (F. & C.) .. 2,170,819 "

to .. £7,786,319 " say \$38,681,595

AUSTRALIAN COLONIES.

VICTORIA—Pages 260-1.

Imports from

(exclusive of

gold) .. £ 5,713,141 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 6,613,514 "

" (F. & C.) .. 7,286,194 "

£19,672,789 " say \$78,363,945

NEW SOUTH WALES—Pages 262-3.

Imports from

(exclusive of

gold) .. £ 3,696,019 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 4,333,719 "

" (F. & C.) .. £14,723,729 "

£12,753,467 " say \$63,767,335

SOUTH AUSTRALIA—Page 259.

Imports (exclu-

sive of gold) .. £3,214,869 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 2,016,843 "

" (F. & C.) .. 2,228,313 "

£7,450,025 " say \$37,330,525

QUEENSLAND—Page 269.

Imports from

(exclusive of

gold) .. £871,235 stg.

Exports (U. K.) .. 815,638 "

" (F. & C.) .. 890,828 "

✓ £2,577,701 " say \$2,577,701

WEST AUSTRALIA—Page 268.

| | | |
|------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Imports from .. | £162,985 stg | |
| Exports (U K) .. | 167,368 " | |
| (F & C) .. | 185,102 " | |
| | £511,555 " | say \$2,572,775 |

TASMANIA—Pages 265.

| | | |
|------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Imports | £125,375 stg | |
| Exports (U K) .. | 271,478 " | |
| (F & C) .. | 306,392 " | |
| | £1 003,730 " | say \$5,016,225 |

NEW ZEALAND—Page 266.

| | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------|------------------|
| Imports (exclusive of gold) .. | £3,149,970 stg | |
| Exports (U K) .. | 3,361,562 " | |
| (F & C) .. | 3,615,168 " | |
| | £10,156,700 " | say \$50,783,500 |

"Gold," which is a natural product of Australia and New Zealand, is very properly, referred to under head "Import," from the Australian Colonies and New Zealand to Great Britain, can only be estimated approximately (as the "bullion" return is notoriously defective) by allowing for it, the difference between Imports (as above given) and exports, and which I render thus:

Gold Colonies, viz.: Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Queensland, and New Zealand—as per tables aforesaid:

Total Exports £35,915,071 stg., say \$179,575,355

Total Imports (exclusive of gold) 16,675,934 " " 83,374,670

Total Gold Imports £10,240,137 " " \$96,200,685

SUMMARY of Australian Gold Colonies and New Zealand Trade.

Total Import (exclusive of gold) £15,675,934 stg., say \$ 83,374,670

Total Import gold 19,240,137 " " 96,200,685

£35,915,071 " " \$179,575,355

Total Export (as above) .. £35,915,071 " " 179,575,355

£71,936,142 " " 359,150,710

These Colonies have always paid 20 shillings in the £. They do so still.

Add for Australian Colonies not producing gold.

TASMANIA as above £ 1,003,730 stg., say \$ 5,016,225

WEST AUSTRALIA as above. 514,555 " " 2,572,775

Total Aust. C. and New Zealand £73,448,427 " " \$366,739,710

NOTE.—The marked and continuous progress and prosperity of these Colonies preclude any assumption of "balance of trade" against them. Their rate of progress during the past decade, warrant an estimate of 50 per cent. in advance, in the next five years.

GENERAL SUMMARY OF BRITISH PACIFIC TRADE.

| | |
|--|---------------|
| China, including Hong Kong and Macao | \$151,126,975 |
| Japan | 45,877,500 |
| Islands in the Pacific | 861,625 |
| Straits Settlements | 38,681,595 |
| Australian Colonies and New Zealand | 366,739,710 |
| Total | \$502,287,405 |

UNITED STATES TRADE RETURNS.

(Last A.D. 1873-4 to June 30, 1874)

Pacific, Eastern, and Australian Trade.

Extracts from Commerce and Navigation Returns of 1874.

Page 433.

JAPAN.—Trade at Free Ports A.D. 1873.

Amount stated in Japanese "Yens" and fractional "sens." The former is equivalent to the American dollar (gold). The latter I omit:

IMPORTS from.

| | |
|----------------------|------------------|
| Specific | 21,340,785 yens |
| Ad Valorem | 4,722,160 " |
| Duty free | 2,244,717 " |
| Department Stores .. | 797,394 |
| | say \$29,105,056 |

EXPORTS.

| | |
|------------------|--------------|
| Specific | 18,337,850 |
| Ad Valorem | 1,835,318 |
| Duty free | 644,849 |
| | 20,818,017 |
| | \$49,923,073 |

NOTE.—This total is what my addition makes it, but in this blue book it is given at "21,217,481" a difference of 399,474

Total \$50,322,547

Page 124.

CHINA AND JAPAN.

Note by Author.—There is no separate entry under head China, at least I could not find one.

| | |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| Imports from | \$36,445,314 |
| Exports (Domestic) | 15,000,751 |
| (Foreign) | 2,775,493 |
| | \$54,221,554 |

This, I take it, does not include the special entry as to the "Free Ports," but is principally, probably almost wholly, as to China trade, with some accidental and exceptional trade, *en route* within Japanese waters.

SANDWICH ISLANDS.

| | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Imports | \$1,316,270 | |
| Exports (Domestic) | 654,103 | |
| “ (Foreign) | 43,088 | |
| | | \$2,013,461 |

“BRITISH EAST INDIES AND AUSTRALIA.”

(Thus lumped in official report.)

| | | |
|--------------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Imports from | \$19,998,165 | |
| Exports (Domestic) | 4,082,747 | |
| “ (Foreign) | 66,695 | |
| | | \$25,147,607 |

DUTCH EAST INDIES.

| | | |
|--------------------------|-------------|-------------|
| Imports from | \$7,556,954 | |
| Exports (Domestic) | 255,134 | |
| | | \$7,812,088 |

BULLION.

CHINA AND JAPAN.

| | | |
|--------------------|--------------|--------------|
| Imports from | \$ 1,349,761 | |
| Exports to | 11,285,694 | |
| Re-export | 2,759,726 | |
| | | \$15,395,181 |

SUMMARY OF TOTALS.

| | |
|--------------------------------------|---------------|
| Japanese Free Ports | \$ 50,322,547 |
| China and Japan | 54,221,554 |
| Sandwich Islands | 2,013,461 |
| British East Indies and Australia .. | 25,147,607 |
| Dutch East Indies | 7,812,088 |
| Bullion—China and Japan | 15,395,181 |

Total.....\$154,912,438

ADD

| | |
|---|---------------|
| British Pacific Trade Total as aforesaid | \$502,287,405 |
|---|---------------|

| | |
|---|---------------|
| Present Total of North and South Pacific Trade | \$667,199,843 |
|---|---------------|

At the present rate of progress of the Pacific Trade, it would, in five years (before which, of course, the Railway could scarcely be built), probably rise to a thousand million of dollars. On that, less than one per cent. would “run” the road, 2 per cent. pay cost, and 3 per cent. give good dividends on stock—verifying my estimate *ad hoc* in my Britannicus’s letter 8 of 1869, as given above.

In relation to the above authentic data, it is to be remarked that they do not include that, on the whole, not inconsiderable trade in the two Pacifics which customs returns but very imperfectly represent, especially as to value.

The most marked feature in the above tables is the exhibit of enormous balance of trade, in products and manufactures, against both Britain and the United States, and yet it is much less than it used to be. Both pay largely, most largely, in coin (principally silver, I believe) for their imports from China and Japan.

This balance must, I humbly consider, naturally diminish, with the increased facility of communication with those peoples, and with the removal of that “Chinese wall” of non-communication with foreigners which present Chinese emigration and Japanese liberalism in government, are fast demolishing in that quarter. The change in this respect within the last three years is marvellous, and is one of the most pleasing and encouraging of human movements, *en masse*, in the true direction, in the history of the human race—a movement which, all, however indirectly concerned, should take part in, and should, to best ability, assist.

To show its progress (rate of progress) a comparative table of past annual trade returns would be necessary—but these I cannot here well give, without encumbering what, I feel, is already too much encumbered. On this point, therefore, I must refer the reader to the trade returns in question.

But in addition to these official data, I might legitimately point to certain notable facts, stated in press, in relation to the American Pacific Transit Trade, which indicate a growth and extent of such trade, and its enormous profits, beyond all recorded calculation.

1. The United States Government demand from that part (probably about a half) of the transcontinental railway called the Union Pacific, over one million dollars as the claim (“5 per cent”) of the Government (on condition of subsidy, I presume,) on the nett returns of the road. This, I take it, is for one year—the last. The other portion of the road (“Pacific Central”) from San Francisco westward, may, for the argument, be fairly assumed to have realized to the same extent. This would represent an annual nett revenue of forty million dollars—just about what I calculated in my Britannicus letter No. 8, in June, 1869, five and a half years ago, when really, I had not much of booked fact to go on.

And here I feel tempted to state a fact somewhat personal and therefore objectionable perhaps, but which may explain in some measure, how, I, an humble individual in northern Canada, and not in trade, should venture to thus write on such a subject.

Twenty-four years ago I wrote the

M. S. all ready for publication, of a small work on Japan, with a glossary of over five hundred Japanese words and phrases in ordinary use, there. The work was not published, however, because the magnificent and very full United States Government report, on Japan; of the day, on the conclusion of the Commodore Preble expedition to that country for the release of certain American shipwrecked mariners, held in confinement, there, took the ground from me.

In writing up the work I had to look into all available works on Japan, and the trade—and general foreign policy of that country, and also of its neighbour China. I was drawn to the little (a leisure) task, by the story, with a few notes, and a well told narration from an old native born British Columbian, Mr. Ranald McDonald, son of the late Chief Factor Archibald McDonald, of his adventures, in an eleven months residence in Japan. Let me give his story, briefly, as I gave it once before in my *Britannicus* letter No. 7, giving an account of his exploration and charter right for a waggon road with tollage from Bellacoola (Pacific tide water) to Cariboo, in 1862.

RANALD McDONALD'S ADVENTURE IN JAPAN.

"McDonald, born in Astoria, educated in Red River, and Canada, in sheer adventure, took passage in a whaleship bound for the North Pacific waters, on the express stipulation that when the ship should be off the coast of Japan he was to be permitted to leave her, in the pinnace or small boat he bargained for and took. This was about thirty years ago, when the rigour of the Japanese decretal of exclusion was carried in utmost rigour even against shipwrecked mariners. McDonald presented himself as a cast-away. His total baggage was a small box, with his books, viz.: Bible, Euclid, histories, &c. for his idea was if spared, to teach, and himself learn. He was conveyed, by land and sea, from Yesso, the extreme north of Japan to Nagasaki, in the South, the then sole port open to any foreigners, and that only to the Dutch, and even to them, under very close restrictions. There, he was put to a series of most severe ordeals of his courage, veracity and motives. He faced all, and braved all, with great tact, though at times, as he

told me, he thought every moment they would chop off his head. At last, in assembled court, full of armoured pageantry, he was told to bow his head, like all the other people, including all the "nobles" present to the ground. At a sign, all did so: McDonald alone, excepted, who sat staring at the Governor: at last, in a burst of admiration, his Excellency exclaimed, in Japanese, "You have a big heart." From that hour he "lived in clover," as Hildreth (pages 502-3) says of him, making him, however, as the historian says, "teach them English." Many years afterwards in reading of the English and American treaties with that power I recognized in the name of the chief interpreter, or one of the chief interpreters—for they always act in "double" in Japan—that, (viz., Mooryama), of McDonald's brightest and favourite pupil.* I give this episode, to show that my humble authority† is not quite a nonentity. He in his own humble way, contributed to obviate the difficulty and inconvenience of Dutch interpretation in the communication of British thought and sentiment to a people, who, of all others I know of, have the closest affinity of spirit to the British race. They, in fact, in heart and mind, are the British of the East. They require but the iron link to bind them in cognate bonds."

2. Another fact, worthy of notice, as indicative of the immensity, and *elan* of this new American Pacific Transit-Trade—is the enormous profit of the very first Steamship Line across the Pacific to China and Japan in connection with the railway. From the Customs record of their American Port, and from that Company's own showing their freight returns for the last year amount to about \$3,000,000 (three million of dollars) for "passage fare" we may fairly add, I presume, \$2,000,000 more.

In addition to that we have the significant fact that the Company, before being two years in existence, I think, had a million of dollars. or about that, to spare, for "crumbs" in Congress, to the "needy" and actually so spending it, yet grew rich, still richer.

3. A second Pacific Steamship Line, for

* The same, I believe, who, about 25 years afterwards was first Ambassador of State, for Japan, at Washington.

† "Authority" as to the Bellacoola route as the best across British Columbia to Pacific Port, and as to the difficulties—"impossibilities" as he termed them—of the Bute Inlet route for a "waggon road, or even mule trail."

the same trade has just been started with a capital of \$10,000,000, paid up—and that principally, if not wholly, in California alone.

4. We have just had, in the report of interview of the Delegation of leading merchants in the Tea Trade of Canada, with the Hon. Mr. Cartwright, as Finance Minister, a most intelligent and lucid, and, I would say startling exposition of not only what Canada is neglecting and losing every day, but of the present, actual and fast growing mischief to Canadian Trade in general as well as in Tea from China and Japan.

Tea, as we all know, is what the Trade calls "a leading article," and draws, into its own groove and working, very much besides, even in other branches of trade.

The gentlemen from Montreal, Hamilton, Brantford and London Boards of Trade who composed that delegation, were, so far as I know, of all political parties, some of them—such as Mr. Cramp, a prominent supporter of the present Ministry. What do they say?

Extracts from Report of Interview, 22nd Jan. 1875.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—What is the exact estimate of the tonnage you make?

Mr. BROWN (of Hamilton "spokesman") said somewhere in the neighborhood of 5,000 tons, or ten millions of pounds. The American Government had serious intentions of re-imposing duties on tea and coffee, and if it occurred it would make the matter one of comparative ease for the Dominion Government to impose the proposed tariff.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—Would you import the whole five thousand tons?

Mr. BROWN said no, the English market supplied a good deal of our teas.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—How much do you suppose would come direct?

Mr. BROWN said he was not prepared to say the relative quantity, but Mr. Cramp, of Montreal, could. As long as the policy of the Government would be to develop the direct China trade, the great bulk would come from China.

Mr. GILLARD (of Hamilton) said that the Custom House returns at Hamilton showed that the last nine months of 1873, that city, in round figures, imported from Great Britain 170,000 pounds of green tea;

from China, 181,000 pounds; and the United States, 89,000 pounds; then for the corresponding nine months of 1874, the imports of the same port were from Great Britain, 61,000; from China, 133,000 pounds, and from the United States, 217,000 pounds; showing a decreased import from the Great Britain of twenty-five per cent.; from China, thirty per cent.; and from the United States an increased import of 140 per cent. over 1873, demonstrating clearly that the direct import trade is fast falling back into the hands of the New York merchants.

Mr. BROWN said in general terms they claimed that abolition of this duty had seriously effected the trade between Canada and China, and they now asked for fair play at the hands of the Government as Canadian importers.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—The tea you import from China is usually green, and the black tea is imported from Great Britain?

Mr. CRAMP said the large consumption of tea in Canada was green tea, but both green and black tea were imported from China as well as from Japan by Canadian importers. He thought the importation of black tea from England was quite as unnatural as the importation of green tea from there. They felt that the present condition of the law in the United States was singularly unjust towards Canada. It was particularly aimed at Canada. The importers therefore felt that they should be protected by the Dominion Government. They were quite willing to let the Americans have the use of our markets if they would let us have the use of theirs.—This ten per cent. may be said not to be in the interest of consumers. He thought they could show, however, that the imposition of this ten per cent. tax against the United States would not increase the cost of tea to consumers in Canada, but would simply transfer the tea trade from the United States to Canada and England. It might be said why then did they fear United States competition?—but it turned entirely on small matters such as commission, storage, transfers, &c. If the present state of affairs were permitted to continue without any advantage to the consumer, they would let the United States take the whole China trade which should be in the hands of Canadians. It could not be said that the importers wanted to make money out of the

consumer by this move, as he did not think it would raise the price of tea one penny in the pound, if anything. Whenever the Americans were disposed to let Canadians into their markets, he did not think there is a man in Canada who would want to secure a monopoly. Canadian tea importers had all lost a great deal of money by the late change in the tariff.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—The total value of tea imported is three or four millions of dollars.

Mr. ROBERTSON said it averaged about 33cts per pound.

Hon. Mr. BURPEE—I think the returns will show last years' importation was about thirteen million pounds, seven millions and a half of green tea and five millions and a half, nearly one million and a half of which came from the United States.

Mr. CRAMP (of Montreal) said the Canadian importers did not import all their teas into Canada now. They imported large amounts into New York, where they allowed it to remain in bond and imported it into Canada as they required it, so as to take advantage of the rise and fall in the American market, and what came in that way into Canada was classed as American tea.

Hon. Mr. BURPEE said it was entered for the country from which it came.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT said he did not suppose Canadian importers look so much at the four or five thousand tons of shipping as to the control of the tea trade.

Mr. CRAMP thought if this ten per cent. having been left off was put on again, the Americans would seriously consider the question of taking off their ten per cent., as they valued much the trade with Canada, and if we could get admission to their market through that change instead of the five thousand tons we now import into Canada, we might import very largely to supply the Western States.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT said he understood that the Americans were extending their trade east from the Pacific.

Mr. ROBERTSON said they claimed that this ten per cent. duty would not increase the price of tea to the consumer. The tendency was not to make large profits or losses under peccoliar circumstances, but it was a continuous thing which was leading New York to be the centre of distribution of teas for all Canada. The American and Canadian importers purchased their

teas in the market. They were delivered equally cheap in Canada and the United States, and as long as the two markets kept at the same level the merchants were on the same footing, but Canadian importers had to suffer from the fluctuation of the American markets. If trade were depressed in the United States and good in Canada, the Americans immediately flooded our market and brought it down. If prices raised in the United States the American merchants had the advantage of it, whilst Canadian merchants we kept out of it by the ten per cent. tariff.

Mr. CARTWRIGHT said he quite saw the loss to Canadian importers, but that was not the point.

Mr. BROWN contended that the competition between importers in Canada was sufficiently keen to protect the consumer in the price he will have to pay.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT said that in the last year in which they had the ten per cent. tariff, that in spite of it we imported nearly one million and a half pounds of green tea from the United States, paying the ten per cent. duty on it, which was *prima facie* evidence that the price of tea was raised to the consumer, as the consumer had to pay that duty.

Mr. GILLARD said his experience was that their importations were not half as large now as they would be if they had a market for their teas. There were ten importers in the United States now for the one there used to be, and Canadians had to compete against the most speculative market in the world. They had energy and enterprise enough, however, to meet the Americans if their markets were thrown open to us. The consumer did not reap any advantage where the fluctuations in the markets were spasmodic.

Hon. Mr. CARTWRIGHT—If it were you on one side and the American on the other I would not have two words to say on the matter, but the third party, the Canadian tea consuming public, has to be consulted. How many distinct cargoes of tea were imported into Montreal for the year ended the 30th June, 1874?

Mr. CRAMP said he could not tell. A few years ago it was an important interest, but it had now died nearly out. There were plenty of means and plenty of enterprise to do this trade, but they were forced by legislation to employ New York merchants

to import for them. A large amount of their own individual trade had been done in New York lately.

Mr. GILLARD said they would have lost a great deal of money on their teas this year if they had not left them in New York in consequence of the number of competing merchants who came in here from the United States.

Mr. BROWN—We claim that by the abolition of this duty a serious injury has been done to the direct trade with China. We also believe that its reimposition—as we cannot get equal rights from the United States—would revive the material interests of our merchants. We also particularly claim that the return to the old state of affairs, the reimposition of the ten per cent. duty, would practically benefit the consumer, and from our own experience in Canada in the past we cannot refuse to accept the very high authority of the President of the United States, that in their country the consumer is not benefited in any manner by the abolition of the duty. I am free to confess that I was one with many others in the country who were gratified with the idea of a free breakfast table, but whenever the profit is made in the passage from China to Canada it certainly does not reach the consumer. I am sure that from the sentiments I heard expressed in the west, particularly from the expressions of public opinion, that we have too high a feeling of fair play to advance our peculiar views with regard to personal interests if they were detrimental to the interests of the country. * *

I give these facts somewhat at length, and as bearing on the question of policy as well as the subject more immediately in hand under this caption of "Financial Basis," but their importance justifies them.

5. Mail and military service.

6. The statistics first above given as to the Pacific Trade of Great Britain and the United States, apply, of course, only to those countries. But on this general subject of "through transit trade," the trade of all Europe with the further "Orient" and with all Pacific parages, is to be taken into consideration.

The population of Continental Europe relatively to that of Britain may be said as ten to one, and its contribution to an Americo-transcontinental transit trade may

certainly be assumed as equal to that of Great Britain.

LOCAL TRAFFIC.

By the time the railway, from Ocean to Ocean, would be finished, at least a million of inhabitants, industrious settlers, would be living along its way, and would contribute some amount of local traffic. Two dollars per head per annum is, I believe, the usual estimate on this score. Say two millions on local traffic, at the very start.

More, much more, under this general head of probable traffic, might be advanced in support of the scheme—but in the face of the actualities and portentous facts above referred to, and in view of their significance to us of Canada, and to Britain herself, the question, in trumpet tone, arises

WHY NEGLECT THIS THING?

CONSTRUCTION AND LINE—NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

(*Montreal Gazette* 19 Dec. 1873.)

LETTER II.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—As to the immediate construction of a railway from Winnipeg to Pembina, that, all must admit, is of first necessity. The "Allan Contract," we all know, promised it for 1874. As a mere off-shoot or branch of the main line—main line from Halifax to Pacific—it could no more affect the national or military character of that Imperial highway than does any one of our inter-American railway connections affect or threaten our present Grand Trunk or the Intercolonial Railway. The line, in its whole length, by its position—back of settlement, and with the St. Lawrence and the people's breadth of Canada and our Indian plains between it and the border is impregnable. But of course, as any one may see, to dispense for "all time," with a line wholly on Canadian soil, between Winnipeg and the Ontario system of railway would be to practically Americanize, not only such piece of road, but all westward to the Pacific. On this point, as you well know by reference to the predictions of the *Globe* (Toronto) itself, both parties—all parties—are agreed.

But "South must at once be kept with British Columbia," says the new Premier. Certainly. That is just what, with every

possible, and with wondrous energy, was being done by those who, with an intelligent sense of the need, had undertaken the mighty work, when, in stealth and in darkness, the spoiler came by and stopped them. At the moment almost the entire force of the Survey staff was in British Columbia, seeking exhaustively, a choice of routes feasible. One route, ascertained by instrumental survey, viz, that to the mouth of the Fraser—a point only about half an hour's steaming from Puget Sound (only six miles from the American boundary) would answer the American Company admirably. Hence the "grab,"—but there are other considerations—To get to Puget Sound—a harbour of harbours, the finest in the world, the American line would, from the east side of the Rocky Mountains cost, I estimate, about twenty million dollars more than our line from Jasper House (east side of the Rocky Mountains) to the mouth of the Fraser, say Burrard's Inlet. I know both routes, personally; the American line has to cross much higher, and broader and more ranges of mountains—regions which even the fur trade could not thoroughly penetrate save by routes most sinuous. True, there is a large land grant, and very much,—say one-half—of that from Pembina to Puget Sound, well fitted for agricultural settlement, and on the western side of the Rocky Mountain, especially near the coast, exceedingly rich in merchantable timber, as well as being good farming land, but on the other hand there is—as is admitted in pages 8 and 9 of the pamphlet prospectus of the Northern Pacific Railroad Company itself,—(page 8,) "Detached portions"—these are the very words of the book—"of the vast "region tributary to the Northern Pacific "Railroad, where, for the present—" (Query, *When* will it be otherwise?) "the rainfall "is insufficient for most crops, and irrigation is necessary, yet even in these localities the grazing is unusually good." (Page "9,) "Not more than one-fifth of the "land from Red River to Puget "Sound is unsuited to cultivation, "and this fifth is largely made up of "mountains covered with bunch grass "valuable timber, and filled with precious metals." As to the remark about the "bunch grass," it is to be observed that it is of very limited vertical area, not over two thousand feet, and does not cover one-half of the mountains in question. At the same time, I must

say that in the main the pamphlet in question, garish though it be, is, so far as I know the country, correct in the main.

Still, the sober truth, as established by abundant official records of experts, as to our line of projected railway via the Yellow Head Pass, proves that on every foot of the way, from Red River to the Pacific, man may live out of the abundance of the teeming earth beneath him. Even on the height (highest) of the Pass, near Abreda Lake, a survey party of 13, from choice, comfortably (wood sheltered) wintered. In fact, in every respect, in shortness, grade, coal, wood supply, in woods protective against snow drift, and every facility of working, *inter alia* freedom from Indian trouble, our line is infinitely superior to all others possible—so superior that the N. P. may well sacrifice its present all—go into bankruptcy &c., to get it, or even a partnership in the concern. All that has been shrewdly calculated, no doubt, and hence the desperate effort to get it *per fas aut nefas*.

But, it seems to me, that there is more than mere individual effort to wrest this national highway supreme from us* We have to look further and deeper for adequate motive" in the move against us as a British people in this matter. Whence comes that move? Why? For what?

These are questions which we all must meet, each in his respective and appointed way, and as good citizenship may call forth. In Parliament, in the Press, at the Polls, and in every legitimate manner of free discussion let it, squarely and openly, be put: What does all this mean? "Use the road for American purposes for *all time*!"—What does that mean? "Canada First."—What does that mean? Does it mean, Britain—our Mother-county, *last*?" "Reciprocity—everything for that."—What does that mean?? Does it mean that in this precious Canada of ours, for which Britain, our mother, has spent her gold in untold millions and given so largely and freely of her blood, her flag is to be sold as a rag to any * * * * * across the way?

Commerce is power. Yes! and by it, and it alone can the seas, and in the seas,

* Subsequent developments, in insolvency, show a singular connection with the Naval Department of the United States with this "Jay Cooke" railway, in the course of which, a seizure conservatory, at law of the "Iron" got for the railway and pledged to the Secretary of the Navy, to secure the Navy's deposits to the house of McCulloch, Cooke & Co., of London, was made at the time of the Jay Cooke & Co. failure.

the isles, and other teeming shores be ruled. Give to the United States, with their immense material resources and wondrous vitality and enterprise, the monopoly, practically, of the transit trade between the two oceans, and they, in a trice, will cover the seas. Then, the Great Republic will "march the deep." On the other hand, let Britain, still "Mistress of the Seas," but hold and use as her own the ocean-link which her Canadian sons propose to forge her, and her flag may for another thousand years safely brave all battle, and the breeze. In this sense, the work is of highest Imperial necessity—as an iron bulwark of British empire, thing great and sacred, calling for all jealous guard. On this theme I may have more to say. It is one for quick and earnest consideration and action.

Yours,
A BRITISH AMERICAN,
M. McLEOD.

Dec. 12 1873.

(*Montreal Gazette Jan. 1874.*)

EASTERN TERMINUS.

When the question of *Eastern Terminus* of our Pacific Railway came up, some two years ago or more, Mr. Blake, in emphatic vaunt, in his place in our Commons, declared, after determination by the House for the south side of Lake Nipissing, that he would yet bring the line round by the west side of the Lake. The Chief Engineer (Mr. Fleming) had, I understood, given *on connaissance* his opinion against the Western side as being full of difficulties (transverse rock, ridges, &c.,) and out of the direct line from extreme northern objective point to nearest seaport. However, Mr. Blake, speaking for *Western Ontario*, and more particularly *Toronto*, had a reason, and it was obviously this. From the physical features of the country, and especially in face of that fifteen hundred feet height between the *Ottawa Valley* and the *Huron watershed* on the line of route in air line, to nearest seaport and to which I have already alluded; a railway terminus at the west end of Lake Nipissing, or any where near they would, if not impracticable or inaccessible to Eastern railway, be most favorable for *Toronto*, the natural trend of railway route from such western point being that way. Moreover, it would, to Quebec

or eastern railways, present a greater breadth of *Ontario* to be got or bought (if possible) and to be traversed under an *Ontario charter* (if procurable.) In fact, a *Western Nipissing terminus* would practically bend the main line to *Toronto* and thereby lengthen it over three hundred miles: an elongation which would be fatal to at least one distinctive excellence in our route, viz.: shortness beyond all others possible, north of the *Gulf of Mexico*. Such a project is not in *Dominion* interest, however well it will serve *Toronto*, *New York*, and other foreign American behoists. True, the present Premier, in the immediate interest of the *Northern Pacific Railway Company* (a bankrupt concern with just "assets" enough to trouble us) speaks of starting from *Pembina* and going thence only westwards for "all time" as the "organ" gives forth,—but still, in alternative, Mr. Blake's threat, aforesaid, rings in our ear. We here, we see, we feel the dangers of the hour, and, as need be, shall act. Suddenly, in coward, silent cunning, our very polls are sprung on us. So be it!

Yours,
A BRITISH AMERICAN.

(M. McLEOD.)

December 31, 1873.

EASTERN RAILWAY CONNECTIONS.

(*Montreal Gazette 5 Oct. 1874.*)

PACIFIC RAILWAY TERMINUS (EASTERN)—
CHANGE BY MR. MACKENZIE—QUEBEC
RULED OUT.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—According to the reported answer of Mr. Mackenzie to the deputation of the other day requesting that "before a subsidy should be granted to any railway connecting with the Eastern terminus of the Canada Pacific Railway through the Ottawa Valley, a thorough examination of the North Shore route through Pontiac should be made from *Almer* to *Nipissing*," it seems that the point fixed by Parliament, some three years ago, for *Eastern Terminus*, viz., on the South side, (i. e. Shore) of Lake Nipissing, is, in the mind's eye of this most singular "Premier," and by his (or Mr. Brown's) simple "*sic volo, sic jubeo*," to be removed 50 miles, South—

50 miles nearer *Toronto*—and all that distance off the direct line to nearest Canadian seaport. Why not make the *Terminus* in *Toronto*, at once, *Mr. Brown*! Then *New York* would be nearest seaport, the year through, and our great railway interoceanic would, essentially, be truly *American*, for all practical purposes. There are crooks enough already in the "*Mackenzie Line*,"—so called—and there can be no wisdom in making it more "*zany*" or serpentine. We want a line straight and short as possible.

But there is another important consideration in this matter. The digression proposed would place the *Terminus* in question on the western slope of the range of elevated land between the *Ottawa Valley* and the *Huron watershed*, a range rising to about two thousand feet above the sea (1,500 feet above the *Ottawa River*) as shown by the Geological Reports, with topographical charts of *Sir William Logan*, in 1856-7 and 8. *The natural trend of railway route from such point is southwards towards Toronto.* In this light, the change would be a gigantic fraud; a trick so monstrous and startling, as to call for the most energetic resistance not only by the Province of *Quebec* but by all concerned in the general interests of the scheme, and more especially by the people of the *Ottawa Valley* (both sides), and by all, in fact, east of *Toronto*.

Unfortunately, little is known of the physical features of the region in question—little known even by members of Parliament—but there, in authentic blue book, are the leading physical facts I state. But in any case, this change of terminus, in the teeth of what Parliament has determined on this point, cannot be legally made by the mere *ipse dixit* of even an "Order in Council." As to the refusal by *Mr. Mackenzie* to recognize, by Dominion subsidy, *Ottawa North* as part of Canada proper in the Dominion field of railway enterprise in connection with our proposed Pacific Trunk Line, all I shall at present say is, that *Quebec*, (the Port of *Quebec*) and *Montreal*, with their joint line of railway in course of rapid construction from the Port of *Quebec* to *Nipissing Terminus* as declared by Parliament should see to this. *A deni de justice* so glaring, so insulting in fact, should rouse the whole Province of *Quebec* as one man in assertion and vindication of right. But, alas! that whole magnificent stretch from

Quebec to near *Nipissing*—nearly 500 miles—continuous, of *Quebec* counties of immense natural resources of wealth, and requiring but railway for developement, has not a single representative in the Dominion Cabinet. The "*British*" of this Province have for "*rep*" at the Council Board only *Mr. Huntington*!—of the "*American Border*"; the *habitué* of the *Jay Cooke & Co.* offices of the United States, &c., &c. As to the French members in the Cabinet, they, evidently, count as *nil*, or as mere crew under the command of *Commodore-General Brown*, who with his *Lieutenant Mackenzie*, is now sailing our Ship of State into American waters.

More anon, perhaps.

Yours, BRITANNICUS.
Montreal, 28th, September, 1874.

SECOND DEPUTATION, viz: From the *Quebec North Shore Railway Company*, and the *Montreal Northern Colonization Railway Company*.

(*Montreal Gazette*, 14th Dec., 1874.)

CANADIAN PACIFIC RAILWAY—EASTERN
TERMINUS, CONNECTIONS.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—A railway meeting, joint of the Boards of Directors of the *North Shore Railway* and the *Montreal Northern Colonization Railway Companies* has just been held in *Quebec*, and at which several resolutions in their common interest were adopted, and one appointing a deputation to the Premier of the Dominion Government for the presentation of a memorial on their behalf. Considering the nature, extent and importance of the interests involved, it may, I think, be fairly said that no more important meeting, save that for the Confederation of Canada, has been held in *British North America*. These two Boards represent, in effect, the Province of *Quebec* in a supreme effort, in a sense, for the justice due it in the *Federal Pact*. They represent nearly 500 miles of railway in the shortest and best possible line from the eastern terminus in question, as fixed by Act of Parliament, to nearest Canadian seaports—*Montreal* and *Quebec*.

The work, to the amount of about \$2,000,000 or, perhaps, double that, is already far advanced, and has been so, and is still.

being advanced on *solely Provincial resources* viz, municipal aid and governmental subsidy in lands and money.

Essentially, however, it is a *Dominion work*, as being the *shortest and best possible* connection of the Canadian Pacific Railway with nearest Atlantic sea ports. Abundant survey, by civil engineers of highest standing, have ascertained and officially reported the fact.

On a former occasion, some two months ago, Mr. Mackenzie very emphatically gave the Ottawa and Pontiac counties delegation to understand that they need not expect any aid from "his Government," and that he intended to remove the Eastern Pacific Railway terminus some *fifty miles south of Lake Nipissing*.

As to the effect (inevitable) of such removal to *shunt* off the main line towards Toronto over two hundred miles off the direct line to nearest sea port, I wrote at some length in your columns at the time, giving, as my authority as to the physical features of the region in question, on which I so predicated, Sir William Logan's reports and accompanying topographical maps. No higher exists, nor, I believe, can exist, Mr. Mackenzie's informants to the contrary (whoever they may be) notwithstanding.

But here an important question arises, viz: Can Mr. Mackenzie (or "his Government") remove the terminus in question so far south? I humbly hold he cannot, without authorization from Parliament. Let us see what has been the legislation on this point.

The first legislation on it is to be found in section 10 of chap. 71 of 35 V, (1872), which runs thus:—"A railway, to be called 'the Canadian Pacific Railway' shall be made in conformity with the agreement referred to in the preamble to this Act, and such railway shall extend from some point on or near Lake Nipissing and on the south shore thereof, to some shore of the Pacific Ocean, both the said points to be determined by the Governor in Council, and the course and line of the said railway between the said points to be subject to the approval of the Governor in Council."

The next legislation on the point is chap. 14, sec. 1 of last session—the "Mackenzie

Act so called—which reads thus—"A railway to be called the 'Canadian Pacific Railway' shall be made from some point NEAR to and South of Lake Nipissing, to some point in British Columbia on the Pacific Ocean, both the said points to be determined and the course and line of the said railway to be approved of by the Government in Council."

It is to be remarked that the first of the above acts, says "ON THE SHORE" while the latter says merely "near the shore."

In connection with this it is to be borne in mind, that Mr. Legge's report, as well as those of Messrs. Shanly & Clarke, show, authoritatively, that there is no physical obstacle, but, on the contrary, marked facility, for such work as the terminus in question and its incidental city site, "on the South Shore of Lake Nipissing," viz, at, or on the shore, near the mouth of "South River," where even already there is, according to Mr. Legge's report, a prosperous settlement. That point, according to him, can be reached from the Ottawa Valley by an average gradient of only five feet to the mile, the crest being, according to Mr. Shanly's report, only 170 (one hundred and seventy) feet above the Ottawa river at the mouth of the Matawan.

From the extensive flat—comparative flat—bordering for 4 or 5 miles or so back, the southern shore of Lake Nipissing at its east end say, the land (according to Sir W. Logan's reports, which give heights as scientifically determined by him and his staff, in much detail) rises gradually, till at the source of the Meganatawan, the nearest, and main stream south, of the little river called South River, it attains a height of over fourteen hundred feet above the sea, and which to all Ottawa Valley roads, to a point "50 miles south of Lake Nipissing," would necessitate gradients tantamount to at least forty miles of extra railway, on the old rule that a gradient of 19 feet to the mile is equal to a duplication of road in its working. The Toronto roads, being on the west side of this great "hog-back" of obstructive Laurentian or Huronian rockland, would avoid the necessity of such "clime" to or from terminus. In other words, the removal of terminus to such point (viz, 50 miles south of Lake Nipissing) would enormously increase cost to all eastern connections. In some measure should they have aid from Mr. Mac-

kenzie's Government. Writing hurriedly, I may supplement this with further development of this argument.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

December 9, 1873.

Article on *first report* [imperfect, as subsequently appeared] of interview.

PACIFIC RAILWAY—EASTERN CONNECTIONS.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—The important railway deputation from the Province of Quebec, referred to in my last, has just had its interview with the Premier of our Dominion. The result seems on the whole to have been satisfactory to the delegation—more so, certainly, than that accorded to the Ottawa Pontiac Counties deputation, as reported, some two months ago or more. Now, it would appear that Mr. Mackenzie intends to remove the terminal point in question, not "50 miles or more," "directly south" of Lake Nipissing; but to some point not defined yet, but, perhaps, somewhere on a line of route running east and west from the mouth of French River to the Village of Renfrew [the present terminus of the Canada Central Railway], a distance of 217 miles according to Mr. Fleming's report.

As to the construction of this stretch of railway through an utter wild, Mr. Mackenzie (it is reported in the local press) assured the deputation "that the Government would feel themselves bound to take into consideration any suggestion that the road from the mouth of French River, east, to the vicinity of Renfrew, should be built entirely by Government; and he also assured the Northern Colonization Railway Company that they would be secured the right of running their trains over any portion of the subsidized road to connect with the Pacific Railway."

All this, be it remarked, is for facility of all railway connection with the Upper Lakes (Huron, Michigan and Superior), and not specially, nor even very apparently, for connection with the Pacific Railway terminus as fixed, contractually, by Act of Parliament, chap. 71 of 35 V., viz., "on the south shore of Lake Nipissing." These are the very words of the Act on this

point—an enactment after exhaustive discussion *ad hoc* in the House.

However, for the present, Eastern connection have no reason to complain of what Mr. Mackenzie offers. The line (new line) he has just found is evidently a fairly good one to what may be assumed as the best point for terminal harbor in Lake Huron for Western transit trade, American and Canadian, to nearest seaports. The line avoids—but just avoids—that obstructive rise of land [more southerly] indicated in Sir William Logan's reports, and which Mr. Legge as well as myself have referred to; and in fact in half its length, viz, from Renfrew to "Burnt Lake" [107 miles], is the very line I projectively advocated in my letters of 1869 on this subject, and which may be seen, in green line, on the map in my pamphlet "Peace River." What the precise distance of "Burnt Lake" is from the south shore—say south-east corner of Lake Nipissing—is not given, but it may be assumed to be about 40 miles in railway line. From it, *via* the valley of the South river, there is not, according to Mr. Hazlewood's report to his chief [Mr. Fleming] any material difficulty for railway route, and the whole valley of the South River [28 miles] is reported as "wide and offering no serious obstructions to the location of an easy line throughout." South river, it is to be borne in mind, runs in a general direction from north to south into Lake Nipissing near its south-east corner, and is almost in air line between Renfrew and the south-east shore of Lake Nipissing, the point contemplated by the Statute cited for Eastern terminus of our Pacific Railway.

If the valley of the South river, for any considerable distance, be adopted by Mr. Mackenzie for his line in question, it would approach the south shore of Lake Nipissing near enough [possibly within 8 or 10 miles] to meet, at least his statutory enactment on the subject, which says merely "near to and south of Lake Nipissing." The variance is not material, and I thus refer to it now, in no spirit of cavil, but to show, exhaustively as it were, the point at issue, viz, the site, to be, of Canada's chief railway centre—a city large. The compromise presented is a fair one, and for it, Mr. Mackenzie [*i. e.*, the Cabinet of which he is head] deserves, under the special circumstances of the case, our humble good word. His next "link" promised, is that from

Lake Superior to Fort Garry, I mean not only the Portage links of the Dawson route but the main line between Nepigon Bay, or Thunder Bay, and Lower Fort Garry. Let Mr. Mackenzie bend himself to that task with his usual energy, and even "Britannicus," with all his past sharpnesses against his policy as to this matter of Pacific Railway, will wish him "God speed."

In its time we will, no doubt, have the *through line* straight [as possible] and strong for every material good to Canada.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

Ottawa, Dec. 18, 1874.

Article on fuller and more correct report of said Interview—Montreal Gazette 30 Dec. 1874.

"GEORGIAN BAY BRANCH"—A MATTER OF TEN MILLION DOLLARS.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—In my letter the other day on this subject, predicating on the brief report just then, on the same day, given by a local paper [*Ottawa Citizen*] of the interview of the railway delegation from Quebec and Montreal, I had unavoidably to touch on points as to physical features of the route in question, which required clearer and more definite explanation than that vouchsafed by the press report at the time. Since then I have had occasion to receive fuller information from an expert of high standing in such matters, present at the interview.

From him I learn that the place for Pacific Railway terminus indicated by Mr. Mackenzie, in his map for the nonce, to the Deputation, is inland, about 25 miles south of Lake Nipissing, and that the line proposed thence east-wards will "actually" [so my informant says, but I think he errs by about 15 or 20 miles] run over the fourteen hundred [and more] feet height reported by Sir William Logan, and to which Mr. Legge and myself have referred. It is to be remarked that Mr. Hazlewood [on whose "letters" alone—not formal professional reports—Mr. Fleming has made up his "memo" for Mr. Mackenzie's use] does

not deny such height of land. On the contrary, his reference to "rugged country" at or near the height of land, "transverse" and also "oblique ridges," and "elevations" would seem to bear out the Sir William Logan reports with their elaborate and most carefully constructed map, and charts, on scientific determination of heights, &c. These reports were made about 20 years ago, viz, 1856-7-8, when no one dreamt of railways there, and without any conceivable reason why Sir W. Logan (knighted for his correctness in such like works) should state and give forth, officially, aught but the truth. It is true, one of his staff, [Mr. Murray] has been got to say, in a newspaper letter published by the Parry Sound Railway promoters, that there was no "mountain crest" in the way. Nobody ever said so; at least I never did [and I was the first—even before Mr. Legge, to refer to the fact in press], nor did Mr. Legge, save in using the word "crest," in the sense of apex of an interposing height of land between the Ottawa and the Georgian Bay.

On this point there is no authority whatever that can be invoked against Mr. Legge, whose work, in *actual location* of the Montreal N. C. Railway from Montreal to the Mattawa, as well as careful exploration thence to the mouth of French River, and of the country between it and the Ottawa, including all the south shore east of French River and miles back, at all available for terminus of a Pacific Railway, and of all which he [the chief engineer of no less than thirteen railways in Canada] has given full and exhaustive reports with all the weight of his professional name. As to Sir William Logan, Mr. Mackenzie—so it is reported—disposed of him, with the summary remark, [with waive of hand] "his reports on such subjects are totally unreliable."

That, I beg to say, and all the world will say—is not true; and further, Mr. Mackenzie, on such occasion, should not have so expressed himself. The Premier of the Dominion of Canada should not so belittle the illustrious Canadian who, by his achievements in science, achievements not only in the closet, but in the rough fields of our northern rock wilds, disclosing in geologic bed work untold wealth for his country, has thrown lustre on the name of Canada, the world over.

I inclose to you the memorandum on

which Mr. Mackenzie bases *his story of facts*, in the case. Mr. Fleming, as Chief Engineer, signed it, but in no way does he give it the weight of *his high authority*, he never having gone over the ground, nor having had any "report of survey," nor aught really reliable on the subject. In fact the "gleanings" [so called by Mr. Fleming himself] culled bear internal evidence of, at least, this, viz., that Mr. Hazlewood has found and reported enough to make Mr. Mackenzie pause, for more light, before committing himself on the subject.

I must confess, that in common with many influenced by the first report [imperfect, as it now appears], I considered the connection of "running privilege" on subsidized line to be really an advantage; and if the line had been at the *comparatively low level of the height of land*, say about 8 or even 10 miles south of Lake Nipissing [where the height evidently rapidly lowers northwards—so, at least, the Hudson Bay Co's charts show, and so do *all official reports since viz., Shanly's, Clarke's, Legge's and probably others*], the concession—if practically and faithfully carried out—would, to all intents and purposes, to all eastern connections, make the eastern end of the subsidized extension or link the Pacific Railway Terminus, thereby obviating to the line from 110 to 150 miles of railway construction where no municipal aid could be had.

As the facts are now laid before me, I regard the matter very differently, and feel but confirmed in what I have advanced as to the superiority, paramount, of Mr. Legge's route—*via* the natural gateway at the southeast corner of Lake Nipissing to Huron slope. The difference of summit on the two routes is tantamount, as I have before said and shown, to an operative equivalent [if I may coin such term] of forty miles in favor of this line, and I am assured, and from personal knowledge of much of the route, I believe, that the whole, say from Ottawa to the Pacific Railroad terminus, can be made as a first-class work, with iron bridges and steel rails, for \$23,000 per mile, and with wooden bridges and iron rails for \$28,000 per mile, and at the same time leave a margin of about half a million for profit on contract. If desired, and at the same time authorized, I could give responsible names on this point.

The other route, rocky throughout and

rugged, a region in the main of pine, rock and ever running transversely [save perhaps some fifteen or twenty miles in the valley of South River] with a summit of about 1900 feet above the Ottawa River at the mouth of the Petawawa, whose valley is just in line, in the main, would cost, I am sure, from \$40,000 to \$50,000 per mile—say in all, according to the distances given by Mr. Hazlewood, "217 miles" from Renfrew to the mouth of the French River, about or over \$10,000,000.

On what?

Mr. Hazlewood's letters, as "gleaned," as aforesaid? On what else in the way of specifications, pray? Yet to-day, 21st Dec. is the last day for tenders, as advertised! This is really worse than the Pacific Telegraph expropriation of public moneys, not only without authority from Parliament, but in the teeth of its Act.

But there is another point to be touched. According to Mr. Mackenzie's map and plan, the spot for the Pacific Railway terminus is [so I am told] marked about 25 miles south of the nearest shore of Lake Nipissing, and, mischievously for all eastern connections, on the west side of the height of land in question.

In fact, Mr. Editor, Mr. Mackenzie's "Georgian Branch," ostensibly of the "Pacific Railway," is really *not* that, nor, if a Dominion Statute, determinative of covenantal matter, [as was, I hold, Ch. 71, of 35 Vic.] be anything in law, or right, can it possibly be.

There is in this matter, something, really, I fear, of a "Pacific Scandal."

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

Ottawa, N, 21 Dec., 1874.

EXCLUSION OF ALL CANADA, EAST OF TORONTO, FROM THE WESTERN TRANSIT TRADE.

(From the "Quebec Chronicle" 8th Jan. 1875.)
Editorial, citing "Britannicus" of "Montreal Gazette" of 5th January 1875.

We would particularly call the attention of our Quebec readers to the important letter of Britannicus published below, the facts therein stated being of vital interest.

The placing the eastern terminus of the Pacific Railway a considerable distance to the south of Lake Nipissing, instead of directly on its southern border, as contemplated by the Act, will materially lengthen the transit to Quebec, while it correspondingly shortens it to Toronto, as a careful inspection of the map will show.

The true policy of the Quebec members, as it appears to us, should be to insist on the terminus being placed on the northern side of the lake, where, we are credibly informed, the best as well as the most direct line exists.* It would there connect naturally and easily with the Northern Colonization Railway, now under construction as far as Aylmer, and for whose extension West a good line has been obtained the past summer as far as the Mattawan.

Even located north of the lake, the Toronto lines would still have the advantage in point of distance.

The men of Quebec will indeed be derelict in duty if they do not exert themselves to the utmost to have the original terminus, at any rate, as arranged by the Act, adhered to.

TORONTOGRITISM vs. ALL CANADA. (To the Editor of the Montreal Gazette.)

SIR,—This may seem a strange heading, yet, though reluctantly, I feel it but citizen duty to point to it at this juncture. All, of course, must condemn the raising of sectional issues in matters of general import to the Dominion, and in such case there must be blame somewhere.

In the following remarks I propose to show where and in what it is:

In former letters I have briefly, but, I think, pretty clearly shown that the inevitable effect of "fixing" the eastern terminus of our proposed Pacific Railway "50 miles," or even "25 miles," directly south of the shore of Lake Nipissing, instead of "on," or even "near" such shore, will be to encumber and practically block all eastern connections, and thereby divert the transit to Toronto, over two hundred miles, as I have said before, from the direct and best line to nearest Canadian seaports.

In connection with this feature in the present scheme of the Government of the day, I would respectfully, as a matter, of the very gravest consideration for all concerned,—and in this, *all*, I contend, are, for the present and future most deeply concerned,—submit the following facts and propositions:

1. That by such change (one in the teeth of original statute *ad hoc*, as I have already shown) all Canada east of the meridian of Toronto (nine-tenths of the country as peopled) would be debarred from all or any benefit in the Pacific and North Western States transit trade.

2. That the effect of this, in ordinary course of international transit commerce with the United States, would be to make, especially in winter, Toronto the *entrepôt* of New York for our Pacific and North Western trade.

3. That the establishment of such a main line of inter-oceanic and North Western commerce would be a prejudice, grievous and disastrous in some degree, not only to all Canada, eastwards from Toronto to Halifax, but to the high national interests involved in such a scheme.

4. That such a scheme is not only antagonistic to the interests and rights, in the Federal compact, of all constitutional Provinces besides Ontario, but even to Ontario itself from Toronto eastwards, say three-fourths of the population.

5. That all railway enterprise, from Halifax westwards, has, more or less, been predicated on this ultimate and even early western connection or extension, so as to secure, in measure, transit traffic with the Great West and North West.

6. That the physical features of the regions to be traversed by such traffic, and as authoritatively made known to us, present, on this score, the following salient points, objective, of the proper line or lines of route to be adopted by us:—

From the Straits of Mackinaw to nearest sea port, (summer) Montreal, the distance in air line, is only about 550 miles; and of which about 200 miles is easy lake navigation, say to proposed terminal harbour at mouth of French River. From this point to the Ottawa Valley, *via* the South-eastern shore of Lake Nipissing, and the Ottawa Valley thence to Montreal, a railway route of easiest gradient, presenting every facility for construction and working, presents

* This undoubtedly is the fact; but as service of Western trade, via French River Harbour, and also Pacific Railway extension to Sault Ste. Marie, were matters of first moment in this direction, the terminal point was, by Dominion Act, ch. 71, of 35 V., restricted to the south shore of the Lake Nipissing.

itself. Allowing a broad margin for curvature Mr. Legge, C. E., [who has recently actually located the line from Montreal to Mattawan—300 miles] gives in page 22 of his report of 1874, the following estimate of route from Chicago to Montreal:—

| | |
|------------------------------|------------|
| Chicago to mouth of French | |
| River—Water..... | 530 miles. |
| French River via Matawan and | |
| Ottawa—Rail..... | 414 “ |

944 “

In the same pages, in contrast, he gives the following as to the same terminal points:—

| | |
|-------------------------------|------------|
| Route via Collingwood and To- | |
| ronto—Water..... | 575 miles. |
| Route via Collingwood to Mon- | |
| treál—Rail..... | 427 “ |

1002 “

In gradient some advantage can be claimed in favor of the Ottawa route, which at no point rises higher than 650 feet above the sea, while on the other route the Grand Trunk rises to considerably over 1,000 feet above the sea, if I remember right. On this score of gradient an advantage of 20 miles may be fairly claimed for the Ottawa Valley. In any case, an advantage of fully sixty miles in shortness over the existing shortest or possible one, can be urged for the Ottawa route from Lakes Superior, Michigan, and northern part of Lake Huron, to Montreal or other eastern seaport. In juxtaposition with the above, it may be stated that the total distance from Montreal to Chicago, via the great lakes and the St. Lawrence, is “1,348 miles.”

7. With the accretion of export from the great West in question, will rival lines from the chief Atlantic ports be extended to the great railway centre in the Nipissing Basin, and as a subject of legitimate enterprise to all Canadian enterprise in the way of railway traffic, the policy of the day, as to such, ought to be one of utmost fairness to *all* in the direction of the true interests of the country.

I might say much more on this important subject, Mr. Editor, but, for the present I merely offer humbly the above for the consideration of my fellow-countrymen of Canada.

Yours,
BRITANNIOUS.

AMERICAN AND ANTAGONISTIC POLICY OF THE PRESENT DOMINION GOVERNMENT.

(*Montreal Gazette*, 17 Oct., 1874.)

“And be these juggling fields no more believed,
That palter with us in a double sense;
That keep the word of promise to the ear,
And break it to our hope.”

To the Editor of the *Gazette*.

SIR,—The policy of the present Ministry of Canada is, and has ever been, one of marked bent to *American* rather than to British, or even to Canadian interests *per se*. I firmly believe this, and I believe the mass of the people of Canada now begin to believe it. Our ears are dinned by a loud-mouthed cry of loyalty, but in their mode of expression, be it on political platform, “stump,” in banquet hall, “meeting-house,” parliament or elsewhere, there is ever, for American ears, *sotto voce*, a covered assurance of fidelity adhesive to their dollar-dominion. Even in their State papers and Acts of Parliament, and in their press, there is a strange manner of double talk, of speech to two sets of ears, avoidance amounting often to actual self-contradiction, *double entendre*, and of absurdity, when treating of matters—like the Canadian-Pacific Railway—of immediate bearing on the political position, now and prospectively, of Canada. In the case of the proposed treaty there is something even worse.

The theme is a large one, and I shall not enter on it at present, further than in the following limited line of remark which I feel called on at this juncture to make.

The events of the last eighteen months in the political arena of Canada, force us to note, *inter alia*, the following facts:—

1. That in deadly opposition to the scheme of a Canadian Pacific Railway—one of such pre-eminent and unrivalled advantages in every respect, whether for the world's inter-oceanic commerce, or for the settlement of the Pacific Slope (the richer side probably, of the North American continent)—the gigantic railway interests of New York, Boston, Chicago, and of all the United States, in fact an aggregate equal to the national debt of Britain—have, by means most foul, accidentally, swept our late polls, and that it is to that our present masters owe their place.

That interest and its cognates are an ac-

tive potentiality in our midst, doing their own dark work, by agencies drawn from amidst ourselves. *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

2. Our own Canadian begot Grand Trunk Railway itself is now, by its American connections east and west, in effect an American institution, and as such has opposed *à outrance*, our Canadian Pacific Railway scheme. In my humble opinion, its proprietary—English-stockholders—have been misled into a false position in this matter, and that, too, to the prejudice of their material interest as a necessary LINK—a most important link—in the line of traffic from Nipissing to Atlantic seaport.

3. The remarkable growth of Canada in material wealth and progressive industry since the abrogation of the late Reciprocity Treaty, and that in the face of disturbing influences incidental to the process of change of our political status as British Colonies, has but whetted American desire for our absorption.

4. For the command of the Pacific Ocean trade—a cardinal point in present American national effort—monopoly of inter-oceanic communication by rail is necessary, or, at least seems so. To this end, even already, for *obstruction*, and for that solely—for the *San Juan* channel leads only to British waters, British shores, British ports and a British Province—the American is erecting forts on that impregnable fortress rock-isle, with its thousand-feet hill top, all ready for batteries of Rodmans, fit to sink, in one short day, all the navies in the world. A fearful fact! So that, should our Pacific Road be made to Bute Inlet, Burrard's Inlet, or any point on the Georgian Gulf, *American guns* would practically command its western terminus. This is an indisputable fact, and is established by Mr. Fleming and Captain Butler, and other writers, whose word on the subject cannot be questioned. To me, it is strange it should be so much ignored in present and past negotiations about British Columbia.

5. In consonance with this American policy to grapple our Grand Trunk Road, and bend it to American ends, is this change, by Mr. Mackenzie, of eastern terminus to a point "50 miles south of the south shore of Lake Nipissing," thereby, in effect, *shunting off* towards Toronto and New York, and other American marts, all the railway commerce by our Pacific line, and

which, *properly*, should be allowed to flow through more easterly channels to nearer sea port, and in subservience to Canadian interests at large, and to British, rather than to those that are foreign.

6. Convinced, of late, that the people of Canada, *en masse*, insist on a Pacific Railway and that, as soon as possible, the present Cabinet, the very men, who, when returned, shouted—to please their American masters—"that the road should not be made for forty years, *if ever*,"—now to keep their snug places of full \$7,000 each per annum, &c., &c., *pretend* to yield to the cry; but, at the same time, they, in their own peculiar way, determine to "kill the thing" by twisting, lengthening and breaking it into utter uselessness; or worse still, to make, ghoul-like, political food ("capital") out of the carcass. The details on this head are too long for present writing, and they have been already indicated briefly, under other signatures in your columns; unanswered, they remain unanswered.

7. The present Ministry, even yet so far as can be gathered from their avowed organs, such as the "*Canadian Monthly*" of Toronto (see page 248 of last number, September) look upon the work in question as "not primarily a through freight road." These are the very words of the article, evidently meant to be a leading one—but, it goes on to say—"for the purposes of domestic economy,"—and further, in preceeding page, in "conclusion" (a most absurd non-sequiter like all the rest of the "5 conclusions" of the *lucus a non lucendo* "argument" of the 20 page article in question) it is laid down—as principle, of course,—that "as no section of the mainland of British Columbia is so "thickly settled, or likely soon to be so, as "to require railroad facilities, ample time "should be taken in selecting a route," &c.

These are singular conclusions, and are expressive of what may be termed the "cart before the horse" and "milk-cart" policy of our new Ministers of State. Our idea (poor dunderhead that we are!) was to make the iron horse first carry, over trackless wilds, our good emigrants to those glowing distant pastures of our great North-West, to utilize them for their own good and ours, and that, under our own dear old flag before *another people* should therein walk and take possession by right "divine" of primal squattership; and rifle. We live and learn.

De plus—We thought the road—as a sort of land ferry between the two oceans—was to be as short as possible, and essentially, a “through freight one,” assuming ever that by law of “tactical evolution,” lateral roads, common and rail, would grow from the main and ever living, ever feeding, ever fruiting Grand Trunk. But no! Mr. Mackenzie’s road is, it would seem, to be a “domestic” one—*quid est*, I take it to be, in a way brought to every man’s door—like a “milk cart” as aforesaid—*provided*—it is to be presumed—the customer be “Grit.” What of the non-Grits? For *them*, the road is to be bent, in avoidance, I suppose! Of such nonsense it is impossible to speak except in its own way. *Ad absurdum, absurdum*. Such an exhibition of really worse than drivelling incapacity for statesmanship as we have in this “Mackenzie Ministry and policy,” so-called, is beyond, not only all precedent, but belief, save to those who have closely observed them. There is, not unnaturally, and excusably, a measure of general faith in the office of Minister of State, given by the people, “subjective;” but in this instance—one *sui generis*—the principle [if we can call it a principle] is mis-applied. There is, moreover, mischief to largest and highest public interests in the matter, and it should, at the earliest moment, be checked and remedied.

8. The Pacific Telegraph scheme* is either based on a foregone conclusion to have no Pacific Railway, or it is a huge and hideous fraud. There are no means of finding in the field, *where*, survey for railway, has been made—and that, in the wildest wilds of North America, where for hundreds of miles at a stretch, probably no white man ever trod, before Mr. Fleming’s staff did so, in hurried exploratory survey

* The only warrant for Pacific Telegraph expenditure is 37 V., chap. 14, sec. 3 (Canada), and is obviously in subservience to, and for the railway. It runs thus: “A line of electric telegraph shall be constructed in advance of the said railway and branches, along their whole extent respectively, as soon as practicable after the location of the line shall have been determined upon.” At the time of “contract” by the Mackenzie Government not a foot of the railway line in question was, nor in fact, could be, “located,” in the sense of the statute.

The terminal points were undetermined—save the proviso for the eastern one on the “South of Lake Nipissing,” as per Act of Parliament—and the principal objective points, e.g., those north of Lake Superior, varying, at Lake Nipigon, about 100 miles in transverse distance, and those in passage of the Rocky Mountains, varying from the Yellow Head Pass to the Peace River Pass, at least 235 miles, according to my calculations. Starting from “Lower” Fort Garry (Stone Fort)—a naturally objective point—the angular difference of the two routes, each about 1,100 in length, by Y. H. and P. R., would be about 15°. At the Nipigon divergence, it would be three times greater. *Fig.* No line of telegraph could serve both of the alternate routes in question.

winter and summer, during the last year or two. With the burning of the Pacific Railway office, on the advent of the present Ministry into power, all the field notes and plans of survey—worth a million and a half—so tells us, Mr. Fleming—were utterly destroyed—burnt to smoke! As well try to follow a chalk line on ocean, as try to find the old lines! Besides, there was no “location” of line; nor could there yet be. On parts of the route, viz: From Manitoba Lake to Fort Edmonton, 750 miles—no line has been surveyed for railway. From Thunder Bay to Red River is a continuous stretch of over 400 miles of rock, swamp and water, utterly uninhabitable. The Dawson route with its chain of widely branching lakes and deep bays does not admit of a telegraph line. As to British Columbia, from Albroda Lake direct to the present telegraph line there, is the hardest piece of country in British America to traverse, and strange to say, though I know it to be traversable—for I lived close by about four years—it has not yet been done, so far as I know, by any white man! Our true railway route to the Pacific, I know is there, but the men who ought to see it, *won’t* look at it. In the face of such facts, the \$800,000, or more—say the million—of the people’s money, signed away by Mr. Mackenzie, the other day is—What? Mr. Editor—Give it name, if you can, I cannot—“Sunk in the sea,” it would be comparatively harmless [save loss of the money]—but *will* the said million so disappear, and buried, harmless sleep? No Sir! It will work—work, as such things of corruption ever work, and the result will be! Ah! who can tell? We must see to this in time.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

[*Montreal Gazette* 16 Dec. 1873.]

“under such circumstances, we should use the American route not only in the meantime but for all time.”—*Ottawa Times*, Dec. 5, 1873.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—Excuse me for assuming to touch in yours columns on this subject, one on which you have adduced such abundant, and to my humble mind, such unanswerable argument. But, as “every little makes a muckle,” you will perhaps be kind

enough to allow me, as one, like yourself and all true Britons, most deeply concerned in this matter of Pacific Railway, to take note of the above passage, and say a word on it.

To say the least of it, it is, I think all must admit, candid—yea honest—as it is bold. "Use the *American* route for all time," is certainly plain speaking. It is the trumpet blast of the new bought Metropolitan organ of the Government of the day, and speaks no uncertain sound. Thanks for the warning! Thanks for the challenge!

But a word on the pretended grounds on which the above is avowed as the policy now and for ever, proper for Canada. The article from which the above citation is made, runs, in its preceeding sentence, thus—"For our part, from all we can learn, we imagine that the link north of Lake Superior would be ruinously expensive, if feasible even, and that Canada should not attempt to make it if this be the case." Now, sir, the fact is, that, beyond doubt or cavil, it has been ascertained by exhaustive survey, and established by the official progress report of Mr. Fleming, Chief Engineer charged with the work of survey of route for the proposed Canadian Pacific Railway, that north of Lake Superior and Nipigon a route not only *feasible*, but presenting, as a plateau, remarkable facilities for a railway has been found. Allow me further to say (I give my name, &c.), that I have crossed the said plateau, and know, personally, the physical features of the country in question* * * *

But further, Mr. Fleming (the highest authority on the subject), has reported that from Forth Garry (an objective point) to the nearest sea port (Montreal) via N. of Lake Superior, as surveyed—chained—by him and his staff (a distance of 1,250 miles), would be between two and three hundred miles *shorter* than any possible line along the South of the Lake, between the same points.

As to relative cost of the two routes, it requires no engineer to see that that on the S. side would be a most costly one, being throughout, as any good maps will show, a succession of transverse rocky ranges, irregular, broken, and of intractable metallic character. Whereas on the N. side, back

along the level rim of the Hudson's Bay basin from the Ottawa Valley to English River, the route, as surveyed, is of special facility for a railway, viz; along the Ottawa valley to the mouth of Montreal River thence along the remarkably level valley of that stream (a favorite canoe route to Hudson's Bay), thence along the rim of the Hudson's Bay horizontal silurian, and thence by English river, the easiest route, for canoes, in the whole vast regions of Rupert's Land and the Northwest.

I believe, Sir, that the Northern or Fleming route would not cost one-half that of the Southern or American route. But, query—Who? What body of capitalists, propose to construct a railway from Duluth to Ste Marie? It cannot be Mr. McMullen, for that "would be death to *Chicago*." Sir Hugh can't make it, that is evident. No, Mr. Editor, all that has been advanced as to a railway from Duluth to *Sault Ste Marie* is, so far as I know, not only not true, but is, in view of large actual, vested and jealously controlling railway interests far south of Lake Superior, such as the Milwaukee, Chicago, and New York great lines, entirely out of the question—is, in fact, beyond the pale of possibility in the circle of passing and forecasting events across the border. But, be that as it may. To us, Canada—in our autonomy and rising nationhood such schemes of the hour, mooted for a purpose, delusive, if not sinister, are but political anomalies which at once, in repulse, strike that sentiment of true fealty to the empire, land, and flag which, thank God, we can yet call our own.

A word as to the *value* of the Hudson's Bay "wild." For two hundred years a dozen or so quiet old gentlemen of England's London ["merchant adventures," as the charter calls them], on a paid-up capital of at first, £3,000, after that £10,000 *ster.*, in all only £13,000, coined out of the said "wild"—gold by the shipload, and that, in face of costly fight—*verbum sapientibus*—

As to the middle and western part of our C. P. R. R., I shall speak in my next.

Yours,

BRITISH-AMERICAN.

Dec. 12, 1873.

Montreal Gazette, Sept. 24th, 1874.

THE BRITISH COLUMBIA DIFFICULTY—WHAT NEXT!

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—In the present lull of newspaper comment on this subject—one of deep and vital importance to Canada, I feel tempted to offer a remark or two, which, I believe, will express the feeling of the mass of the people concerned.

It has been admitted on all hands that the incorporation of British Columbia in the Dominion of Canada is a necessity to give it form and strength for working in both oceans, and for its proper development.

To this British Columbia herself, while an independent unity, has, in consideration of her own interests, spontaneously committed herself.

As to the preliminaries of her entry into the Confederation, it may be a question whether, in strict law, they can, from the legal character of the two contracting parties—mere corporate bodies with their assigned limitation of functions—import any *resolutive* condition of contract. Public policy forbids such interpretation. There is a power of confederation, but not of defederation—if I may coin such a word. National self-disintegration would be social suicide. This vital principle is one of jealous observance, so far, in the history of the British Nation, and I doubt much whether she would tamper with it in any experimental reconstruction of that "Dominion"—so called by herself—which she as a first gift of the kind, has given to us, her sons in America North. In other words, she may—*intro se*—make a Dominion, but she can do so, only "for good government" for national benefit. Whether she can *un*-make it, in any degree, for even "national benefit" at large, might be a question in some minds; it certainly is not in mine, on the principle that, in this, as in other matters, the greater good—or good of the greater—should carry the less.

The issue between the British Columbia Government and the present one (so-called Mackenzie Government) is familiar to the

public. The former complains of the non-fulfilment of the railway construction clause, which promised "breaking ground" on the Pacific Coast and on the eastern side of the Rocky Mountains within two years, and which period expired on the 20th of July, 1873. It is proved by Mr. Fleming's reports, that every effort in reason has been made on the part of the late Dominion Government to do this, but that the unexpected physical difficulties of the route have prevented them. *Nemo ad impossibile tenetur* is a maxim of old black letter which holds in this as in all matters beyond the domain of absolute and rampant tyranny. But, on the other hand, *diligentia* for, as the lawyers term it, "equipollent fulfilment," is continuously obligatory. The practical repudiation of such obligation by the present Dominion Government is a wrong, for which remedy can be sought only at the foot of the Throne: and there, most properly, and in proper moving, so far as I understand, stands the aggrieved praying for right.

The offer, from the Crown for arbitration, is an act of grace, and ill becomes Mr. Mackenzie and his colleagues (as reported) to scout it, as they have done, after insultingly, day after day, keeping Her Majesty's Ministers of State waiting for an answer to their proposition.* It is a small exhibition of "horn and hoof," which comes well in its way. Dominion "Ministers of State," like other things of life, are to be judged by their fruits, and be treated accordingly.

What next, Mr. Mackenzie?

What next, Mr. Brown?

Is Canada sold, or is it to be?

These are questions started by the events of the day and hour, and it is for us, the people most concerned to see to them, and answer them as best we may.

Yours,
(W. McLEOD.)

September, 8, 1874.

*It was not until about December, after four months of inter-communication between the Dominion and Imperial authorities that a conclusion, (reported to be "satisfactory," but yet to be made known to the public) was arrived at; and that, according to best information, was due entirely to the eminent sagacity, tact and firmness of the Earl of Carnarvon as Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Montreal Gazette, November, 1874.

CANADA FIRST PARTY AND THE PACIFIC RAILWAY.

To the Editor of the Gazette.

SIR,—In the "platform" of this "new party," I remark the absence of the all important subject of our Pacific Railway. "*Hamlet without Hamlet*," is scarcely satisfactory. Next to the fundamental one of British connection, this, to us, all important matter, should, I humbly think, be the chief "plank" in any Canadian political "platform" of the day. The avoidance of the subject by Mr. Blake, in his Aurora address, and the silence of the "Party" on the theme—silence, at least to the general public—calls for enquiry, and suggests a line of interrogation somewhat in the following strain:—

1. What as to the Pacific Railway?
2. Do Messrs. Blake and Moss *still* hold to the "Mackenzie scheme" on this point?
3. Do the Party intend to carry (if possible) Canada into "Imperial Federation," as a *unity*, or as the *disjecta membra* of Mr. Mackenzie's break-back policy?
4. Does Mr. Blake *still* intend, for a purpose, to bend the Pacific Railway line to the *west* side, instead of the east side, of Lake Nipissing?
5. What as to the "British Columbia difficulty?"
6. What as to the issue or issues between our present Dominion Government and the home authorities in this all important matter of Pacific Railway—issues the most grave between Canada and the Fatherland?

These are material questions, pressing

on us with the weight of vital significance to our national fate. We have to discuss them, and, in our own way, as best we may, in due and constitutional course, decide on them. There is much, very much, to be said on the theme of British colonial policy, but what we have more immediately to look to is the "putting of our own house in order" before we presume to take place with other colonists in such discussion. We cannot, I humbly think, enter into the consideration of "Imperial Federation" or any other experimental change of relation with the parent State while this matter of Canadian Pacific Railway remains all unsettled, unhinging us for any work of political reconstruction, and presenting us to the world's gaze as but the fragments of a broken purpose.

On the other hand, to enter the arena with a proposition to leave the work to Britain to do, as one essentially of national behest, would probably startle the whole L.S.D. "school" of England's tax-payers out of the "argument" and precipitate "disruption."

Let Canada, I would respectfully say, first settle this matter of inter-oceanic railway, and that in a manner to serve "Imperial Federation" or any other form of British national *être* which may be determined on, or the British people as now being, and then she may, with some vantage ground from the work itself, enter into such discussion, and, in a way, *dictate* her own terms in the measure of her command of the material interests, vast beyond measure, served and secured by such work on her part.

Yours,

BRITANNICUS.

CONCLUSION.

In taking up my pen for this, I feel that either I should say a good deal, in the way of harmonizing comment on the several and perhaps somewhat varied letters in the public press I have written on the subject of Pacific Railway and North West developement in general for some twenty years past—or say as little as possible.

I have no desire to play Mentor, for that is not my "place"; but appealed to as I have been, especially of late, from all quarters, from Cariboo to London, to start an organization of practical agency for the object advocated by "Britannicus," I would, for present conclusion, but repeat my invariable answer to such application, viz. :—"It is not for me [a "nobody"] to "start such a work, but for the *chiefs* " [whoever they might be] of the party " [Conservative, and *loyal* of the Reform]—"for surely there is brain enough in the "heads that have made Canada what it is, "to know how to keep it, now that, under "their fostering care, it has become so "well worth keeping."

The answer—I am advised—has struck; but with, or for what results remains to be seen.

My own opinion, I must candidly say, is not a very hopeful one. A spirit of petty personal rivalry, in a quarter where such unwisdom is most mischievous in its effects, seems to rive and paralyze that body of *Patres Conscripti* to whom we habitually look for good and faithful government—government in true fealty to the British Crown—in Canada.

The combination against them is one of a character to require much sacrifice of purely personal considerations in resistance. But casting a retrospect on the general history of statesman-life in Canada [including the Maritime Provinces] we find record of heroism enough to warrant some hope for the best. Yes! Even among the many who in the present House of Commons are, in the main, supporters of the present Ministry, there is, I verily believe, a loyalty, really true as steel, and which but needs to be disabused, to ensure its true place in the present, silent but deadly struggle against the national existence of Britain in America. Virtually, our Flag is snatched! It is ours to save it—and with it, our young national life, and its every bright, great promise.

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PACIFIC

RAILWAY ROUTES,

CANADA.

BY

M. M^CLEOD,

"BRITANNICUS."

A SERIES OF LETTERS PUBLISHED IN THE MONTREAL "GAZETTE."

PREFACE.

These letters are respectfully submitted under the special circumstances appearing on their face.

I may add, however, in more distinct terms, that I have entered thus somewhat at length—yet too shortly, hurriedly and imperfectly—into this examination of railway routes across our far wilds, feeling that no one else was, it would seem, likely to do so, though needed.

To *public ken*, the whole thing is, and has ever been, it may be said, a sealed book; and yet, on a true appreciation of it—of the great scheme in all its features and bearings—can we—the people of Canada—alone grapple it with that courage and determination, and stern honesty of purpose, which it demands.

PACIFIC RAILWAY ROUTES. CANADA.

LETTERS ADDRESSED TO THE EDITOR OF THE MONTREAL GAZETTE, AND
PUBLISHED IN THAT-PAPER IN THE COURSE OF JUNE AND JULY, 1874.

SIR.—The importance and urgency of this subject are such, I humbly think, as to warrant my obtrusion with a few observations which may, possibly, be of some little value in the way of information to all or most concerned. Accidental circumstances, alluded to by Mr. Fleming in his report (page 13), viz., my early life in the far North-West and British Columbia, and the possession of my father's papers, reports, journals, maps, &c., respecting those wilds, have enabled me to give some useful information as to the least known of the regions in question—regions untouched by blue-book, and much untouched by even traveller's tale. Five years ago, when first the scheme of a Canadian Pacific Railway was mooted, I, under the *nom de plume* Britannicus, wrote a series of letters, defining descriptively, in advance of all others, a feasible line for railway from Montreal to the Pacific. That was during the session of Parliament (Dominion), and the information given was practically acknowledged in the House and by the Press. All survey since then, over the greater part of the vast, utter wild in question, has but confirmed the truth and correctness of my statements and estimates in every particular. For instance, as to the distance from East Nipissing to Lower Fort Garry (Red River), via South end of Lake Nipigon, my sections, as projectively given in 1869, aggregate 970 miles. Mr. Fleming's report, as the result of instrumental measurement along the same objective points, is 973 miles. Only three miles of difference! On actual location of the line we may differ even less. His section at this part is run out, however, to Lake Manitoba, "65 miles" (as he states) beyond Red River, which makes his total to that point "1038 miles," as shown in section sheet 9 in his report.

As to the rest of the route—route for railway with its elongation by curves and gradients in conformity with the physical features of the country—my estimates are equally well borne out by Mr. Fleming's report, but that in a manner requiring elimination from his different section sheets, and as I shall hereafter demonstrate.

As to the PEACE RIVER PASS, Mr. Fleming, in page 13 of his report, has been good enough to give me credit for bringing it to his notice. Of this more anon. In the meantime, as to it, I have, *in limine*, to say that the height assigned to it by me was a mere estimate by myself, on data given in large detail and tabulated form in my pamphlet, "Peace River," page xix of my table of heights, and pages 92, 93 and 96 of text, and also in the preface to the work. My object in doing so was, as I state in the preface, "to direct attention at this juncture, to the particular fact, as a present objective point, that the lowest, easiest and best PASS of the Rocky Mountains, in fact the only one which presents—say by such a Territorial Trunk Road" (*i. e.* such kind of road—for Mr. Fleming did not speak of this particular one)—"as Mr. Fleming in his memorial to the Imperial and Canadian Governments proposed in 1863—a practical gateway to the Pacific Slope, to the waggon of the settler, is the Peace River Pass, and which is less—I make it—than eighteen hundred feet above the sea." The road is indicated by yellow lines in my map to "Peace River." The precise figures as worked out and given for height of the Pass were "1750 feet above the sea."

No one, that I am aware of, had ever measured or even given any sort of estimate of the altitude of this important gateway to our new El Dorado. Mr. Fleming, as he states in his report, despatched, on the strength of my representation, a branch expedition from Edmonton in the Fall of 1872, via that Pass, placing in the hands of his staff, for guidance, my pamphlet with its journals of travel from Hudson's Bay to the Pass, and thence to the mouth of the Fraser, via Kamloops, showing the great land in its length and breadth. I refer to this incident, for I perceive that, some way or other (see *Canadian Monthly* of May last) Mr. Horetsky, the gentleman who, from his chief at Edmonton, got my pamphlet as part of his instructions, has received all the credit of bringing this Pass into notice. Mr. Macoun, botanist, his *campagnon de voyage*, does me, in his re-

port, better justice. But to proceed. The height of the Pass, *i. e.* of the water level of the Peace River, in its passage across the Rocky Mountains, has been since measured by Mr. Horetsky, with aneroid, by observations taken at different points, and has been laid by Mr. Fleming, *at precisely that height*, (see his section sheet 7 of Report at the point marked "Finlay River") the western or upper end of the transverse passage of the river through the range. The next object on the route, westwards, of which I gave an estimate of height, was "McLeod's Lake," on the Pacific slope of the range, and which I laid at 1,900 feet above the sea. Measured since by Mr. Fleming's staff, with aneroid, he gives it—in his said section sheet 7, at "1,850 feet above the sea." The next height given by me is that of "Stewart's Lake," forming, with other large lakes, the trough of the northern half of British Columbia. This I laid at 1,800 feet above the sea. After careful measurement since by Mr. Horetsky, with aneroid, Mr. Fleming's Report gives it, in said section sheet 7, at *that, precisely*. I may state in explanation that I went into this matter of heights to show that this northern plateau of British Columbia is low enough to admit of profitable agriculture and advantageous settlement, notwithstanding its high latitudes, *viz.*, from latitude 53° to 56°; and moreover, that it offers probable easy, or comparatively easy access, by territorial roads, and ultimately, perhaps, by railway—*i. e.* secondary railway—across British Columbia.

For a transcontinental railway, however,—one to be the shortest and best possible between Atlantic and Pacific ports, and wholly on British ground,—I, at the very outset, advocated the *Yellow Head Pass* (old familiar ground to me), and thence, as indicated by the green line in my map to the "Peace River" Pamphlet, to Bella Coola, at the head of the North Bentinck Arm. Allow me to give, from letter 8 of my Britannicus letters of 1869, already alluded to—see slip sent you—a summary of sections of the route proposed by me:—

| Terminal Points | Length Miles | Cvt. per mile | Total. |
|---|--------------|---------------|------------|
| | | \$ | \$ |
| Montreal to Ottawa, via Vaudreuil..... | 106 | 25,000 | 2,625,000 |
| Ottawa to summit between Lake Nipissing and Ottawa River..... | 100 | 30,000 | 3,000,000 |
| Nipissing to Michipicoton River..... | 320 | 25,000 | 8,000,000 |
| Michipicoton River to Fire Steel River..... | 310 | 40,000 | 12,400,000 |
| Fire Steel River to Selkirk (Red River) Settlements..... | 840 | 25,000 | 21,000,000 |

| | | | |
|--|-------|--------|--------------|
| Selkirk (Red River) to Edmonton..... | 750 | 20,000 | 15,000,000 |
| Edmonton to Milton Pass (Yellow Head)..... | 250 | 20,000 | 5,000,000 |
| Milton Pass to Bella Coola (North Bentinck Arm)..... | 400 | 50,000 | 20,000,000 |
| Total..... | 2,665 | | \$30,245,000 |

Pay \$100,000,000

So I wrote, and so all Parliament read, in June-July, 1869. Since then, as we all know, "cost"—iron, labor, &c.,—has increased at least 25 per cent—but on this branch of the subject I enter not. It is of routes—and as known to me—that I would speak. In giving the above facts there is, I feel, a seeming egotism. It is repugnant to me; but I must show credential, and present some measure of credibility in this pleading. Shall continue in my next.

Yours,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, Q., June, 1874.

LETTER II.

SIR,—As the work of construction of the great iron road in question must, in the main, be from nearest Atlantic port—Montreal—and thence, from shiphold with railway plant from England, and elsewhere perhaps, I assume, for the nonce, this port as a starting point. Thence to the south-east end of Lake Nipissing, the line, as reported by survey, throughout its course of three hundred miles of the Ottawa Valley, presents every facility for railway—with an average gradient of only about two feet per mile, and, probably at no point—none so far as I know, and I have passed over three-fourths of it—none, I say, exceeding ten feet per mile. I speak from personal knowledge, and the reports of Messrs. Sharly, Clarke, Keefer (T. C.), Kingsford and Legge, all civil engineers of high repute. By the last named gentleman, the line along the north side, crossing at the Matawan, and thence to the south-east end of Lake Nipissing, has just been examined in exploratory survey, and has been, as your columns showed, most favorably reported on. On the south side—from Pembroke upwards, I am not aware of any explorations for railway line having been made, but from what I know of it, although not a civil engineer, I think I can safely say, as I did in 1869, there is a good line for railway. I hope to see, within two years, on both sides of the Ottawa, to Eastern Pacific Railway terminus at Nipissing, railways that shall serve as

freightways from Atlantic seaboard, and from American and our own manufactories of railway enginery and other plant. With return freight in lumber, and perhaps grain—western grain—from port at French River, there would, I presume, be profitable business for half a dozen railways to and from different points, viz., Ottawa, Toronto, Kingston and Montreal, and even perhaps Quebec, not to speak of other lines, Canadian and American, connecting with other Atlantic ports and market points.

The other points for initiatory work in construction which present themselves are, Sault Ste. Marie—if the line be thither bent—and the head of Nepigon Bay; and, perhaps, also at Prince, Arthur's Landing, Thunder Bay.

I touch on these points to indicate the possibility of constructing the whole of this section—from Nipissing to Manitoba, not only "after forty years," or "if ever," as shouted, on hustings, our present Ministers of State, and as averred their metropolitan organ, "the Ottawa Times," in their first flush of victory—but within forty months—I would say. The Americans, when in lowest exhaustion from their late war, built their Pacific Railway—longer and more difficult, in three years, if I mistake not. Why, in the name of common manhood, I would ask, should not we, with the British Exchequer replete at our back, not do likewise? But, on this head, more anon.

You have, Mr. Editor, given a general statement of the different lines (three) of route, in this section—section from Lake Nipissing to Lake Manitoba—reported by Mr. Fleming. I take up No. 2; the shortest and best, according to his own account. He thus defines it, in page 30 of his report:

"Commencing at the south-easterly angle of Lake Nipissing, the whole distance to Lake Ellen (at head of Nepigon Bay) on Nepigon River, is about 550 miles. The line at Lake Nipissing is 730 feet, and at Lake Ellen 604, above sea level. Between these two extreme points, the route passes over two main summits, one about 110 miles northwesterly from Lake Nipissing at an elevation of 1420 feet above the sea, and the other about 70 miles easterly from the River Nepigon, elevated 1400 feet above the sea. Between these two summits, for a distance of over 370 miles, there is a long flat basin, characterized by no great inequalities. The line for this long distance will be generally very level, the ground averaging from 1000

to 1200 feet above the sea; at one point only, River English, does it dip to 830 feet.

"The route, for nearly the whole distance east of Nepigon, runs behind the rugged and elevated belt of country which presents formidable obstacles on the immediate shores of Lake Superior. This rough district is crossed directly back of Ellen, where it is narrow and probably least forbidding. In consequence, about 25 or 30 miles of the line north-easterly from Nepigon River will show heavy work, while the remainder of the distance to Lake Nipissing, about 530 miles, will, it is believed, be comparatively light."

"In ascending Westerly from Lake Nipissing, the rise to the highest point is less, and the length of time occupied in making the ascent considerably greater than in passing from Lake Ontario to Lake Huron by railways in operation across the peninsula of Western Ontario.

"The Great Western ascends 753 feet in 44 miles.

"The Grand Trunk ascends 967 feet in 38 miles.

"The Grey and Bruce ascends 1,398 feet in 52 miles.

"The Northern ascends 748 feet in 27 miles.

"The total rise on the Pacific line northwesterly from Lake Nipissing to the highest summit east of Lake Superior is 690 feet, and the ascent is spread over a distance of 110 miles, thus indicating an average rate of ascent much more favorable than on the Railways alluded to."

Mr. Fleming, in a foot note, states at what particular stations and points the summits occur in the above, and also in other railways, in Ontario, giving heights and distances, and showing them all to be less favorable than route No. 2 in question.

"Between the crossing of Red River," continues the report, page 32, "and Lake Ellen, on Nepigon River, the distance is about 416 miles. The diagram shows that the former point is 763 feet above the level of the sea, while the latter is 604 feet: the height of land to be crossed is 1,580 feet above the same level, and about 300 miles easterly from Red River.

"In passing through to Lake Superior from the west, a rise of 817 feet has therefore to be overcome in 300 miles, and a descent of 976 in about 116 miles.

"The Grand Trunk Railway," he adds,

by way of comparison, "between Montreal and Portland, running easterly from Montreal, makes an ascent of 1,360 feet in 144 miles, and a corresponding descent in 153 miles.

"The information obtained suggests," he concludes, "that it will be possible to secure maximum easterly ascending gradients, between Manitoba and Lake Superior, within the limit of 26 feet to the mile, a maximum not half so great as that which obtains," he declares, "on the majority of the railways of the continent."

The route is certainly unexceptionably good, especially in view of the fact, as shown by the report, as the result of careful meteorological observations registered and returned over the whole route during two winters, that "the depth of snow is"—as Mr. Fleming, in page 34-1 of his report, says—"generally less on an average than it is at the city of Ottawa."

An excellent feature in the line is that it touches navigation where best it should, viz., at Nepigon Bay, nearest good port—accessible by rail eastwards, from the Prairie or wheat region—and also, that at the point of crossing Red River, viz., at Lower Fort Garry, called "Stone Fort," it touches the head of Lake Winnipeg navigation, and at Manitoba Lake, does the same service to the chain of large lakes it belongs to—an internal navigation requiring but little for practical and beneficial development.

So much, for the present, as to this "Woodland Section" of 1038 miles, as Mr. Fleming designates and reports it.

Yours,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, Q., June, 1874.

LETTER III.

RED RIVER TO YELLOW HEAD PASS.

SIR,—This section embraces what Mr. Fleming very appropriately calls "The Central or Prairie Region"—not that it is all prairie, but that it is chiefly so. The distance assigned, on mere exploratory survey, however, is "1,040 miles," viz., 750 from Red River to Edmonton, and the balance thence to the Pass. The average grade from "Fort Garry to Edmonton" is "2.3 feet per mile." "The immediate ascent to the Yellow Head Pass is not difficult, and the Pass itself is, as it were, an open meadow."

So reports Mr. Fleming, in page 39, when speaking of his forty miles a day ride through it in 1872. From the summit of the Pass to a point "49 miles eastwards" there has been very careful survey, and is reported in pages 143-4. "From the summit the line follows the Miette River down the Caledonian Valley to its junction with the Athabasca, a distance of 18 miles, with a total fall of 352 feet. In the first nine miles and a quarter the fall is only 141 feet, with light work; in the next two miles the fall is 120 feet, but by a slight deviation of the line a grade of 1 per 100 (52.80 feet per mile) can be obtained without heavy works. The rest of the distance to the Athabasca is by easy descending grades, nowhere exceeding 30 feet per mile, and the work will not be heavy." The rest of the route to Edmonton was also surveyed, and is represented—see pages 186-7—as, on the whole, even more favorable. The summit of the Pass is given at 3,746 feet above the sea.

From it to nearest seaport—Montreal—a practicable, and, in every respect, a most favourable route, almost in air line, has been found, with an average gradient low beyond compare, so far as I know, and at no point, in eastward course, exceeding—says Mr. Fleming, as before stated—"26 feet to the mile." I say, "almost in air line," but it is to be remarked, that if *Sault Ste. Marie* be touched, the divergence—and that transversely and diagonally over very rough and rocky ground—will be fully one hundred and fifty miles off the true line. If this American connection be determined on, it would be better to have an independent line, I would say, along the comparative flat immediately back of the Huron shore rim, striking into the Nipissing basin, and there touching railway centre, at the main terminus. Between such line and the one surveyed by Mr. Fleming, along the valley of the Montreal River, there is a continuous uprise—for it scarcely can be called hill—with irregular broken ridges of rock running, in the main, across the line of route. Not to speak of military considerations—and they ought to rule in this matter—such an elongation of line, say over two hundred miles, would materially affect, prejudicially, the commercial character of the route, as the shortest, of railway, from Ocean to Ocean, between the "Great Sailing Arcs," in Northern Atlantic and Pacific, and between mid-Europe and mid-Asia.

To these two main objective points

must all this work of pass-way for traffic and travel between the two "worlds"—East and West—be bent. The Yellow Head Pass in $52^{\circ} 50'$, or about that, of north latitude, is precisely in line, it may be said. The nearest natural ocean port, open to us, thence westwards, is Bella Coola, at the head of the North Bentinck Arm. Its latitude, as determined by Vancouver, Sir Alexander McKenzie, and Lieutenant Palmer, R. E., is about $52^{\circ} 21'$. That of Liverpool as stated in Norie's navigation tables (a standard authority) is $52^{\circ} 24'$. Lower Fort Garry (Red River crossing) is in about $50^{\circ} 20'$. This last is, for Pacific Railway route in Canada, a defined objective point by nature. The same may be said as to the Yellow Head Pass. From its summit to tide water, N. Bentinck Arm, the distance I assigned in my Britannicus letters was, for railway route, with its unavoidable curvature, "400 miles." My map to "Peace River," indicates it.

YELLOW HEAD PASS TO PACIFIC OCEAN.

The description of the route from the summit westwards is thus given, in page 144:—"From the summit of the Yellow Head Pass the line follows down the valley nearly due west to the head of Moose Lake $18\frac{1}{2}$ miles, in which the fall is 344 feet; on the first $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles the fall is about 45 feet per mile to Yellow Head lake, thence along the shore of the same $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles level, leaving the average fall for the rest of the distance 20 feet per mile. The line follows the north shore of Moose Lake 8 miles to its outlet at the west end; on this there are easy undulating grades. The works from the summit to this point, 27 miles, will not be heavy. From the outlet of Moose Lake there is very little fall for a mile and a half, but thence to Tête Jaune Cache, 18 miles, the Fraser falls 924 feet, giving an average of over 51 feet per mile. At Tête Jaune Cache the line leaves the valley of the Fraser and turning almost at right angles follows up a valley on a south-easterly course to Cranberry Lake. The distance from Moose Lake to this is about 32 miles, and the average descent is 26 feet per mile." "From Cranberry Lake to the crossing of Canoe River, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles, is practically level, as the surface of the river is only 20 feet below that of the lake; thence to Albreda Lake, 10 miles, there is a rise of 264 feet. This is on the watershed between the tributaries of the Thompson and Columbia

"Rivers, and, by our surveys, is 2,866 feet above sea level."

From this *hinging point* all survey has proved itself too southerly. The true line is westwards, due west, or nearly so, to the head waters of Lake Quesnel, distant, as I estimated, and stated to Mr. Fleming, probably about 50 or 60 miles from the "Cache"—a space unknown to the old fur traders in these parts, and as to which, I saw by a draft of my father's special report on the subject to the Governor and Directory Committee of the Hudson's Bay Company in London, dated "Kamloops, Spring, 1823," when in charge of what was then known as the Thompson's River District, extending from the Rocky Mountains to the Pacific, and from the Columbia northwards, in fact, all what is now British Columbia and part of Oregon, that he thought a trade track through it could be found, and he proposed, to that end, to send two or three men, along with certain Indians, occasionally frequenting Kamloops, called the "Snare Indians," a small mountain tribe of about "60 families," frequenting both sides of the mountains. They failed to return for a year or two, and the matter was left as it had ever been—even to the North West Company's repeated efforts in that way—a something sought, but unfound. Mil-ton and Cheadle, with true British pluck, half did the feat.

Mr. Fleming, when charged with the Pacific Railway, put, at the earliest possible moment—as appears by his Progress Report of 1872—two specially strong "divisions" of his staff, viz., McLennan's and Mahood's, to the task. The former worked his way up from Kamloops, by the North Thompson, to Albreda Lake. The effort—a really splendid one—cost him 87 out of the 100 of his picked mountain train (largely Mexican) of horses and mules. Mahood had been instructed to begin at the mouth of the Quesnel River, and work up thence to the source. He disobeyed orders, arrived at the river, and not finding, as he says, "boats suitable," he allowed himself to be drawn to the glacier heights of Cariboo, where, of course, and as his master knew, and might have told him, there was no pass for railway. Since then this Quesnel route, strange to say, has been untouched, save just recently, by a flying trip by the District Engineer. Of this, more anon, in my next.

Yours truly,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, Q., June, 1874.

LETTER IV.

QUESNEL LAKE ROUTE.

SIR,—Resuming this subject where I left it in my last letter, I propose to give, from the report itself, sufficient to indicate the correctness of what I have advanced on this point. Referring to page 129, under the head "Journey to Quesnelle Lake," we have the following from Mr. Marcus Smith, District Engineer:—"Friday, 11th October, I received," (he is addressing Mr. Fleming, then, in 1872, on his trip from ocean to ocean) "your last instructions this morning."

"On the 16th I arrived at the Blue Tent, or 127 mile house." * * * "Next day I reached the 150 mile house."

"Monday, 21st October—I started with three white men, two Indians, and a train of seven animals; on the second day's journey the trail crossed a large farm in Beaver Lake Valley, near which we camped. This valley, as far as I could see each way from the adjoining heights, looked remarkably favorable for a line of railway; and as I have already stated, there is but a short neck of land between the head of it and Horse Fly Valley. Next day we arrived at the forks of the Quesnelle river; here there is a thriving village."

"24th October—We started with our pack train on a very rough trail up the right bank of the South branch of Quesnelle river, and at the end of 9 miles came to still water, where the boats were lying." * * * "Sent one of the Indians back with the pack animals to Beaver Lake, to pasture till our return."

Proceeding in two boats, a large and small one, he reports:—

"25th October, 2:30 p.m.—Reached Nim's Point, 22 miles from the foot of the lake. The line of the south shore of the lake for the first eight miles is tolerably uniform, and the slopes from the water not very steep; then there are about four miles in which it is rocky and broken to where the six mile creek enters the lake. From this to Mitchell's Landing (south) is a flat beach covered with cottonwood."

"26th October.—* * * The south shore of the lake, from where we struck it this morning, is an easy wavy line, and the slopes not very steep. All the hills that bound the lake on the south shore are covered with timber from the water's edge to the summit; those on the north are higher, with bald rock."

"27th October.—* * * Arrived at Slate

"Island (58 miles,) where the axis of the Cariboo slate (gold-bearing) range crosses the lake. In three hours arrived at Limestone Camp (No. 7)—72 miles—where the lake bends due north (magnetic.) The first 16 miles of this day's journey the shore line of the lake runs in easy curves, and though the mountain slopes come down to the water's edge, their inclination is not great. Of the other fourteen miles, six are bold and rocky, but with heavy work, practicable for railway construction; the rest is easy."

"Monday, 28th October—We were within seven miles of the entrance to the second narrows" (79 miles from foot of lake). * * * "Here I had a fine view of the Narrows (N. 45° E. magnetic) twenty miles to the last bend of the lake where it runs due north six or seven miles to its head." * * * "This narrow part of the lake is hemmed in by bold rocky mountains, the cliffs along the shores rising 300 feet to 800 feet in height, in some places over-hanging. My impression is that the lake here passes through the Cariboo range, for directly westward were the snow-capped peaks that had been on our left (north) of the lake, and a little to the south of east were the peaks, apparently of the same range between the Thompson and Clearwater, and which continued from the Gold range west of the Columbia river. There were no very high mountains visible northwards."

N.B.—My course, as proposed, is from northwards," at this point. The report goes on to say—

"Mr. Barker," the gentleman of the "flourishing village" aforesaid, who furnished the boats, and guided Mr. Smith—"confirms this—he says that the Niagara River (head tributary and source of the Quesnel) enters the north-east side of the lake three or four miles from its head, that the falls of this river are about 200 feet high, and for four miles up from this the river is very rapid, then there is dead water for about forty miles, in a wide, swampy basin, where the Indians hunt beaver, &c."

"From repeated readings of the aneroid, I estimated Quesnel Lake to be about 2,580 feet above sea-level." N.B.—Three hundred feet lower than Albreda Lake, as already reported.

"The Clearwater River," continues Mr. Smith in page 132 of report, "rises in a range of mountains to the north-east of Quesnelle Lake, which can be reached by a pass (the entrance to which I saw)"—he says himself—"said to be easy and not

"very high. There is then only the short space between Clearwater Lake and the north or Cariboo fork of the Thompson river, about which I can get no information more than that there *certainly is a pass*. I have only met one Indian who had travelled over it some years ago, when he was too young to retain an clear recollection of it. This is undoubtedly part of the Sellkirk range, and I have no expectation that a railway could be got through it without a tunnel of considerable length, but this route would *shorten the line so much* that it is well worth consideration."

Precisely! But why, I would ask Mr. Smith, did he not see to this before, instead of starting, as his report shows, "97 miles down the North Thompson," about 90 miles off—too far south—for even the line proper for Bute Inlet, and at a point over *two thousand feet unnecessarily too low* on this meridian? Section sheets 4 and 5 show glaringly the faults of this line, starting from a point on the North Thompson, 1397 feet above the sea, and between that and the Fraser having to climb heights stated at 3,500 feet, and 3,104 feet above the sea, all which the Quesnel south shore, as described, avoids. As to that "tunnel of considerable length," in Mr. Smith's "mind's eye," it would certainly be interesting to know all, or *something* about it, in an engineering point of view. If I may be allowed—as one to the manor born—to offer an opinion on that point, I would be inclined to say, that the pass there—a point where three ranges meet, and, by law of nature, break into fragments, flanking curve, with moderate gradation—if I may so use such word—would overcome all mountain difficulty. Billowy, rather, and *not mural*, are all our mountains thereabouts. That "tunnel," in fact—good Mr. Smith—should not, I humbly think, be so positively asserted by you! This scheme for Canadian Pacific Railway has "lions enough in the way," in all conscience, without such a one from one employed to remove such bug-bears.

In speaking of the difficulty that the fur trade met with in its attempts to penetrate this upper region, with its fine beaver flats of "forty miles" in extent, it was not—I would observe—the height or steepness of the mountains that blocked the way, but the character of the mountain forest—its immense growth, with an underbrush and heavy obstructive swamp flora, which, commencing at a point about 45 miles up the North Thompson—I remember well the beautiful stream, in its placid lower reaches meandering, facto-

lean—increased upwards to nearly 3,000 feet above the sea. Clearwater River, as any good map—say Trutch's—will show, is only a fork of this North Branch of the Thompson River, which fork (Clearwater) at its head—a long lake—has a tributary from the east, rising close, apparently less than a mile, from the main fork, a point easily accessible, by stream course, from Albreda Lake. There is no room for tunnelling heights between these waters—waters in common—of the "beaver flats" aforesaid. The "peaks," about wooded to top or snow-capped, but adorn the scene—and to the Road, when made, will but give, in their altitude above road bed, snow-shed in winter and sun-shade in summer.

Yours,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, Q., June, 1874.

LETTER V.

QUESNEL LAKE TO BELLA COOLA.

SIR,—Returning to our starting point in consideration of this Quesnel Lake section of the route, viz., the "large farm" in Beaver Lake Valley, and proceeding westwards we have the following description of the route, in page 123 of the report: "Journey from the 150 mile" (mile, on waggon road along Fraser River bank) "House to the North Branch of the North Thompson River." "Friday, 6th September—At 9 a. m. started on this journey." "We followed the well beaten trail to the forks of the Quesnelle, about eight miles, then took an Indian trail running in a more easterly direction. On the second day we entered Beaver Lake valley." Beaver Lake is given at "2,110 feet above the sea." We are now on the right bank of the Fraser, at or near Soda Creek. No survey for crossing at this particular point is reported, but is so at a point a little way—about 10 or 12 miles further down—at the Jose Valley. The report, in page 151, on this matter of crossing the Fraser, runs thus: "The line follows the north shore of William's Lake, 5 miles in length, with undulating grades, and not heavy work, thence down the Jose Valley to the Fraser River, a little over seven miles. Approaching the Fraser, the valley becomes deep and narrow, and the descent more rapid, so that grades of 1 to 1.60 per 100 have to be used, but with no heavy work. The

"line crosses the Fraser at an angle of about 45 degrees, requiring bridging 800 feet" (Only eight hundred feet—not a "a mile at least," as Captain Butler pretends, and that, according to him, at a height of "1,200 feet") "long, and 30" (only thirty) "feet above the river level, or 1,374 feet above the sea level; it then follows the right or west bank of the river for 17 miles, in which it has to cross the face of some heavy clay slides and high slate rock bluffs, with some grades of 1.20 per 100; in this section there will be some very heavy works, including two tunnels through limestone rock, one of 1,500 feet, and the other 2,000 feet in length."

As to this matter of crossing, it is to be observed that it would be much easier further up the Fraser, but on this point the report is silent.

I am now following this too southerly line merely for the nonce, as no other is given, and at a certain point, viz., apex in the "Chilcotin Plain," marked "3,700 feet above sea level," in section sheet 5, assume it, but merely for determination of distances and comparative reference as to character of route, for indication of my line to Bella Coola. The middle reaches of the Chilcotin Valley might, however, be used in common for the Bute Inlet and N. Bentinck Arm routes. All descriptions of the country traversed, even at such altitude, about 3,500 feet above sea, represent it as a fine rolling plateau, with forest, meadow and prairie, and do that with beautiful and fish-teeming lakes, the whole admirably fitted for agricultural settlement. The description in pages 120 and 121 of the report so represent it, and so I have given forth, for years past, in press, newspapers and books, but unfortunately there have been no members of Parliament of these parts to take up the cause of Upper British Columbia.

In page 121 of the report, speaking of better ground found considerably northwards of that surveyed, in the first instance, the description in the report is as follows:—"We followed up the Fraser Valley two or three miles, then we made a long detour to the north to head out a deep ravine; passing this, we ascended the high level of the rolling plateau, and saw spread out before us, as far as the eye could reach, an undulating grassy plain, dotted with trees,

"the water courses and lakes being distinguishable by belts of groves of fir and poplar, and close to us was a deep but open valley, which we could trace far away to the north till lost in the undulations of the plateau. In the bottom of this, right in our course, lay a cultivated farm, to which we descended—1,400 feet—by very steep slopes, and there met the owner, L. W. Riskie, Esq., a Polish gentleman, by whom we were hospitably entertained, &c."

From the Yellow Head Pass, via the "97 miles" divergence down the N. Thompson, and thence over the two intermediate summits aforesaid, to the Fraser via Jose Valley and thence "17 miles further down," and thence to this apex in the Chilcotin Plain of 3,700 feet above sea, the distance is given in section sheet 5, at "334 miles." In section sheet 7, the precise point stated at 3,700 feet in section sheet 5 is not given, but a point marked "Old Fort" (Chilcotin), at a height stated at "3,800 feet above sea, is given—and, as the nearest possible, it may, for calculation of relative distances, be approximately assumed as the same. From this point to the mouth of Bella Coola River, the distance assigned, on Lieutenant Palmer's measurements, or estimates, is 170 miles of crooked trail track. This, with the 334 miles makes an aggregate of 504 miles. From this, deduct for the "97 miles" divergence at the N. Thompson, say, at least 110 miles, and for the Fraser Crossing, at least 24 miles, and we have, as closely as may be "400 miles" as the probable length of railway route from the summit of the Yellow Head Pass to tide-water Bella Coola, via the south shore of Lake Quesnel, as marked by my railway line in green, in my map to "Peace River," and as advanced in my Britannicus Letters of 1869. I never, of course, actually measured the route, but I had, accidentally, data to go on, which, then—I believed—no one else had, at least, not to the same extent. I might say much on this score, but will not unless forced to do so by controversy—should it arise.

THE BELLA COOLA ROUTE, GORGE AND SEA-PORT.

This gorge, or valley rather, with its numerous—13 or 14 I believe—lateral valleys, each with its appropriate river, or

* The calculation, in detail, runs thus: Half of total divergence, on triangulation on base line from east end of Quesnel Lake to meridian of "Old Fort, Chilcotin" 72 miles. Reduction as per Lieut. Palmer's estimate, on trail track (tortuous) for "road" route, between "Old Fort" and "The Precipice," say 25 per cent. on 97 miles—say 25 miles. Reduction, for road, on trail, from "Precipice" to tide water, say 5 per cent. on 73 miles—say four miles. Total reductions for road to Bella Coola, 101 miles—deducted from 503 miles, leaves precisely 402 miles. From which, for the shorter arc of my more northern line, a small deduction is to be made—bringing a result within my original predicate.

streamlet, is, I am convinced, "not half well enough known." The charter prospectus (printed and sent to me) for a waggon road through it, in 1862—thus describes the proposed port, and route thence to Cariboo:—"The North Bentinck Arm possesses an excellent harbour, of sufficient capacity to accommodate the largest fleets at all seasons of the year."

"The country through which the road will pass presents few difficulties of construction, and is studded in every direction with open prairies, lakes and extensive meadows, affording abundant feed for pack animals."

"The town site of Bella Coola is admirably adapted for the formation of a commercial depot for the northern portion of British Columbia, being accessible by steamer from Victoria in forty hours at all seasons of the year. The road would be about 200 miles long, that is to say, from the head of the inlet to the point required on Fraser River—say Alexandria. With the exception of a part of the descent through the Coast Range the trail is decidedly of a level character. This descent, or rather slide, is really the only obstruction, and could easily be overcome or avoided—a fact that must become evident to every one when informed that we passed and returned packed horses over it during our trip last summer" (1861). "From the place where the trail first strikes the Bella Coola River in the Coast Range (that is at the foot of the slide, travelling from the interior to the coast) it runs along its bank the whole way to the head of the Inlet, through a deep gorge or pass in the Mountains, which varies in width from half a mile to five miles."

The report goes on to speak of its practicability, first for "mule trail, ten feet wide," then for waggon road; speaks also of its harbor as "favorably reported on by seafaring men"; of its admirable site for a town, facilities for wharves, docks, &c.; abundant timber; gold, copper, &c.; and fisheries of "cod, halibut, salmon, oulachans, herring, &c., and finally the worthy promoters—one of them (Mr. Ranald McDonald, son of Chief Factor Archibald McDonald), a gentleman born in the country, and thoroughly familiar with it, and the other, John G. Barnston, Esq., barrister, late of Montreal, son of Chief Factor Barnston, Hon. H. B. Co., and now, I believe, a member of the Local Legislature of British Columbia—thus wind up: "So that it appears to us probable enough that the future town

of Bella Coola will yet be the terminus of the much talked of Pacific Road through British Territory."

I do not, of course, give the above as "authority," or as ground for aught than further enquiry towards authentic determination of the questions of fact involved.

In the meantime I purpose to examine what best evidence we, so far, have on the subject, and which Mr. Fleming's report—an exhaustive effort—presents to us. This in my next.

Yours,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, Q., June, 1874.

LETTER VI.

SIR,—Continuing under this head, I proceed to show what the report of Lieut. Palmer, R.E., of his survey in Autumn, 1862, as given in Mr. Fleming's report, says of it.

Page 219 of Report:—"North Bentinck Arm, a mere water-filled indentation in the mountains, some 25 miles in length, and from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in breadth, may be taken as a fair type of the other inlets on the coast." * * "North Bentinck Arm receives at its head the waters of the Bella Coola or Nookhalk River, a rapid mountain stream, 80 miles in length, which rising beyond the principal crest of the Cascade Mountains, flows through and drains a portion of that range and, subsequently, the chasm or valley formed by the continuation of the mountain walls of North Bentinck Arm." * * "The valley of the Nookhalk for 40 miles from its mouth is undoubtedly of estuary formation, low, and, in many places, swampy throughout, and to the same process by which, for ages past, the land has been gradually forcing back the waters of the ocean, viz., the deposit of vast quantities of alluvium and drift which have been brought down by the Nookhalk, is to be attributed the existence of the large, flat mud-shoal which extends across the head of the Arm. This shoal, composed of black, fetid mud, supports a rank vegetation of long swamp grass for about half its distance outwards; it is bare at low water spring tides for about 700 yards from high water mark, and at a distance of 800 yards from shore terminates abruptly in a steep shelving bank on which soundings rapidly increase to 40 and soon to 70 fathoms." [Note by myself. * A little dredging will easily improve this.] "Another small

"anchorage is said to exist at the mouth of the Nookmamis River, about 3 miles down the north shore of the arm."

"To build wharves and perhaps a few sheds on the rocky shores of the anchorage, and thence a road along the mountain sides to the spot indicated in the accompanying plan, as suitable for a town site, is the only method I can arrive at by which to meet the requirements of any future traffic that may occur on this route. The site I have selected is, in fact, the only available ground in the neighborhood, a sloping tract of land of about 1,200 acres in extent, covered with a profuse wild vegetation of clover, vetches, or pea-vine, grass, and berry bushes of various descriptions, timbered in many places and generally dry, but breaking up towards the river and the head of the Arm in low swamps and ponds, and damp, grassy hillocks.

"On the north side of the river much of the land is heavily timbered within the line of high-water mark with cedar, cotton wood and some species of fir," &c.

"Half a mile from the mouth, and on opposite sides of the Nookhalk are two Indian villages, &c. Two miles further up is another village, population about 1,200 souls. The natives are physically a fine race, tall, robust and active."

"Navigation of Arm and river is by canoes." Page 222. "The Nookhalk Valley, which averages from one-half to one and a half miles in width, opening out considerably," (probably to the extent of five miles as reported by McDonald and Barnston) "at the confluences of the principal tributaries, is walled in by giant mountains of from two thousand to six thousand feet in height, presenting the usual variety of scenery met with in mountain travels in this country."

"Page 223. "The valley abounds with the natural features usually met with at low altitudes in this country; tracts of heavy forest and dense underbrush; such as we see in the valley of the Lower Fraser, succeeded here and there by groves of alder, willow and swamp woods, occasional open patches of low berry bushes, forests of smaller timber with a comparative absence of brushwood, large alluvial flats, abrupt mountain sides, poor gravelly soil, patches of swamp land, innumerable brooks and sloughs, and large quantities of fallen, and, occasionally, burnt timber."

"Although the present trail passes through a great deal of swampy land,

"there is nothing to prevent a good bridle path or waggon road being carried the whole way to Shtooiht, &c., (57 miles)." Page 224—"Happily, in this valley there is a comparative absence of rocky bluffs running sheer into the river."

"THE GREAT SLIDE" AND MINOR ONES.

"There is an unavoidable slide of fragmentary rock, half a mile in length, at 27 miles from Ko-om-ko-otz, and rock in situ would be met with about two miles above Nookkleia, but neither difficulty is likely to prove of a serious nature."

"Atnarko" (river with two tributaries,) "Valley is similar in many general characteristics to that of the Nookhalk: as its stream is ascended so do the difficulties of progress increase. The valley, which near its mouth is about one mile in width, gradually contracts, and the mountains, although diminishing sensibly in apparent altitude, become more and more rugged, and frequently jut out in low, broken masses into the stream."

"HERE THE FIRST SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO ROAD MAKING ARE MET WITH. From the crossing of the Cheddeakult" (one of said two tributaries) "to the foot of the Great Slide, mountains crowd closely in upon both sides of the stream; frequent extensive slides of fragmentary trap rocks of all sizes run either directly into the river, or into the low swampy lands bordering it, which are liable to inundation at the freshets, and the Indian trail which winds along their faces is difficult and almost dangerous for travel. These slides vary from 300 to 600 feet in height, and are capped by rugged cliffs extending to an average altitude of 1,500 feet above the river, and since they are unavoidable, the labour of trail making between Shtooiht and the Great Slide" (14 miles) will be considerable, and entail a probable expense of "£1,000" (only one thousand pounds)—"Distance from Bentinck Arm, 57 miles."

"At Cokelin, 1,110 feet above the level of the sea, the trail leaves the Atnarko running about south-east, and strikes to the northward, directly up the face of the Great Slide, at a high angle of elevation."

[Query by myself—Could not a railway line be run diagonally across its face, and, if need be, in zigzag?]

"The height of the actual loose rock, as indicated by barometric measurement is about 1,120 feet, the trail barely even winding up this portion,

"but wriggling almost directly up the face in would-be zigzags bitterly trying to pedestrians. Above this it is lost among cliffs and hollows dotted with small timber, and rises more gradually until, five miles from Cokelin, an altitude of 1,780 feet (2,890 feet above the sea) is now attained. The trail now emerges on an elevated, rolling district, where the mountains, with whose summits we are nearly on a level, seem of inconsiderable height and lose much of their rugged appearance."—Altered vegetation.—"Down by a gradual descent of 500 feet to the brook Hotharko, a tributary of the Atnarko, and up its valley seven miles in an east-north-easterly direction to its forks, meeting with no serious obstructions but fallen timber and occasional small rock slides. The space between the forks of the Hotharko, which run in south-easterly and west-north-westerly directions, is occupied by a peculiar mountain mass of basaltic rock, 1,350 feet in height, which has received the name

'THE PRECIPICE.'

"The ascent of this mountain is excessively steep, the trail at first running up the back bone of a singular spur, further up winding among crumbling fragments of rock, and finally, reaching by a dizzy path the summit of the perpendicular wall of rock, 100" (only one hundred) feet high, which crowns the mass, and from which it derives its name."

[Here I would respectfully observe—a tunnel—it seems to me—say about a mile in length, from the eastern slope (slope shown in section sheet 7) of this "precipice" to the base of its "100 feet perpendicular," would bring the line to the head of a system of natural slides and "heavily timbered slopes," which, though steep for ordinary railway gradients, certainly present no feature insurmountable to railway construction and working, as proved, abundantly, under such like conditions, and worse, with higher heights, and steeper gradients, as on the Nevada of California; on the Andes of South America (with average gradients of 500 feet to the mile) for 30 miles together, on Pacific slope; on the Ghauts of India; and on the Alpine heights of Switzerland and other mountain lands, all—save British Columbia—thoroughly or partially railwayed.

At this "Precipice" alone, with its "slides," would special plant and motor be required, in the whole route from

ocean to ocean. The same can scarcely be said as to the Bute Inlet line between the N. Thompson and Fraser, as surveyed, and now given in report.

In Sir Alexander McKenzie's account of this interesting spot, in this *Adam Trail*, and his, to the Pacific in 1793, we have the following as given in pages 233-234 of Mr. Fleming's report. Approaching from the east, he says: "We continued our route with considerable degree of expedition, and as we proceeded, the mountains appeared to withdraw from us. The country between them soon opened to our view, which apparently added to their awful elevation. We continued to descend till we came to the brink of a precipice. The precipice, or rather a succession of precipices, is covered with large timber, which consists of the pine, the spruce, the hemlock, the birch and other trees. In about two hours we arrived at the bottom, where there is a conflux of two rivers that issue from the mountains."

Reverting to Mr. Palmer's report, we see it stated by him that the distance from Cokelin to the Precipice is "16 miles," and that the "top of the Precipice is 3,840 feet above the level of the sea." "Arriving here," he continues, "the traveller enters on the level of the great elevated plateau which intervenes between the Cascade Mountains and the Fraser. Looking eastward the plateau presents but few objects to attract attention, and the eye grows weary in wandering over a vast expanse of waving forest, unbroken save by the lakes and marshes, which are invisible from the general level." "The summit ridge is crossed at a distance of about fifty-five miles from the Precipice, and a height of 4,360 feet above the sea. The extreme elevations of the rolling plateau are very inconsiderable, seldom more than 800 feet above the general level. Distance from Slide to Alexander" (Alexandria on Fraser River) "180 miles."

Yours,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, Q., June, 1874.

LETTER VII.

LEATHER PASS.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE GAZETTE.

Sir,—This is a term applied—or at least was so by the Fur Trade—in a general way to the whole passage from the Northern Bend of the Fraser, eastwards to Jas-

per House. The term "*Tête Jaune*" was applied rather to the "*Cache*," and was so called from the color of the hair—not unfrequent amongst French-Canadians of Breton and Northern France origin—of an enterprising French trapper, of the name of Decogne, who used the singularly appropriate locality—an immense hollow, but comparatively level, of some 70 square miles in area, amongst the mountains there—for his "*Cache*" or *entrepôt* in his line of work.

CACHE TO NORTH FRASER BEND.

The Pass was, in my time in those parts, and for some years after, a highway not only for loads—leather principally—but for the sick and even paralytic seeking medical aid in Canada, from all parts of British Columbia, even from the Babine country. I, however, never passed through it, nor approached it nearer than Old Henry House (Miette), 18 miles from the summit.

From the summit of the Pass to the Cache, the latest re-survey has determined most favourably, as shown by report already cited, the question of railway line. The distance of the Cache from the summit is given at "50 miles," its height, "2,500 feet above sea level." From the Cache the trend of the Fraser is in a general course N.W., until at a point for which "Giscome's Portage" may be assumed, it bends sharply, and strikes due south. This turning point may be laid at $54^{\circ} 25'$ N. latitude. The Fraser at the Cache may be laid at $52^{\circ} 55'$. The trending is therefore, it may be said, 100 miles due north, and all that off the true line to N. Bentinck Arm Port. The distance from the Cache to this bend has never, so far as I am aware, been measured. In section sheet 6, under head "Fraser River," there is a point marked "248" (i.e., miles from summit of Y. H. Pass), with a line of "altitude," marked "1,900" (feet above sea level), but there is no name or designation given to the point. I assume it to be the extreme northern point of the bend, as in distance and height (river level) it agrees with or very closely approximates the distance and height assigned by me, in my pamphlet "*Peace River*," page 113, under head "*Tête Jaune Cache*." The gradient, from 2,500 to 1,900 feet, in the distance (assumed in sheet) viz., 198 miles (river course, navigable to canoes, and without falls) would average scarcely two feet and a-half per mile. From "Giscome Portage," which, by the way, was never a trade-route, to a point in section sheet 7, marked "Cross Black or West Road River," the distance, in sheet, is 95 miles;

thence to "Bentinck-North Arm (Pacific Tide Water)," according to the same sheet is "215 miles," which, however, being tortuous Indian trail, to avoid lakes and swamps, would, for road route, as Lieut. Palmer explains, be reducible, according to his calculation, about 25 per cent, save as to that part, "73 miles," from the head of the Arm to the top of the Precipice. I assume that Mr. Fleming has taken Mr. Palmer's trail distances as given in report. As to the rest of this line, viz., from crossing of West Road River to Bend of Fraser, and thence to the Cache, no measurement of distance or height has, so far as I am aware, ever been made by any one. For lack of better, I take the figures given in section sheets 6 and 7. They stand thus:—

| | Miles. |
|--|--------|
| From Yellow Head Pass (Summit) to Cache..... | 50 |
| From Cache to Giscome Portage..... | 198 |
| From Giscome Portage to crossing of West Road River..... | 95 |
| From crossing of W. Road R. to Tide Water N. Bentinck Arm..... | 215 |
| Total..... | 558 |

Reducible, probably, to 500 for railway route—the whole way, and especially from a point about 45 miles S.W. of Giscome Portage to the Precipice, admitting, I believe, almost an air line—say 175 miles—making my calculations thus, including also a reduction on the "198 miles" given for the distance from the Cache to Giscome Portage:—

| | Miles. |
|---|--------|
| Summit Y. H. Pass to Cache (measured)..... | 50 |
| Cache to Giscome Portage (not measured)..... | 175 |
| Giscome Portage to Precipice..... | 220 |
| Precipice to Tide, N. Bentinck Arm (measured)..... | 73 |
| Total..... | 518 |
| Nipissing to Yellow Head Pass (Mr. Fleming's estimate and measurement of part)..... | 2013 |
| Total..... | 2531 |

I take the liberty of giving these figures, in case it should prove, on survey—if such survey ever be made—that the Quessel Lake line, as I have indicated, is too unfavorable for a adoption. I really think, now, it would be found considerably shorter than I have advanced. At the same time, in point of gradients, it will assuredly be less favorable than the Northern Fraser River Bend Route. The latter route, Mr. Fleming, as he says in his report, has ever looked to as an alternative certainly for access to the Chilcotin Plateau, even for route to "Bute Inlet." North Bentinck Arm, I would observe, is fully a hundred miles or more north of Bute Inlet, and is certainly two-

thirds of that distance (say about 70 miles) nearer the N. F. Bend, and, I humbly think, is equally accessible by rail; we have, at least, no evidence to the contrary. In any case, "Bute Inlet," as I shall hereafter show, is out of the question—is a political anomaly and physical impossibility for such a terminus as our highest and ultimate behests require, however well it may serve the special local—but purely local—interests to which all effort in this great matter seems, most strangely—most unfortunately, so far—to have been bent. On this point, I can only repeat what I have said in my "Peace River" pamphlet, page 103:—"Surely, it is not," I ask, in protest against *non-exploration of all British Columbia*, "that the 'men of the south of British Columbia' who hold present rule," (April, 1872) "are afraid to open to public view the 'grand middle and north of the magnificent country in their trust?'"

Exploration, not only of British Columbia, but of our whole vast North and North-West regions yet untouched by authentic record, and of which the very people of Canada, called on to give so largely of their financial resources for development, know less than they do of the centre of Africa. It struck me also that such exploration should precede the instrumental work of survey for railway. Hence my Britannicus letters of 1869, inviting it. On the strength of them, as avowed by the Finance Minister (Hon. Sir John Rose) in moving the item, when asked *cui bono?* by the Hon Mr Holton, "£300,000 sterling"—besides the like sum for payment to the Hudson's Bay Company for their surrender of charter rights—was unanimously voted—voted specifically for *exploration—eo nomine*.

I was in the House at the time, and of course, with much interest, noted what occurred and was said.

In 1872, early during session in April, seeing nothing done in that way—for the railway survey staff, with its incidental lumber and procrustean measure of work, could not do such flying duty—I wrote my pamphlet, headed "Peace River," touching, in exposition to further invite exploration, the *whole field* from Hudson's Bay to Pacific, and from our Arctic coast to the Columbia River. I did so, as before said, from personal knowledge and my father's and other well-garnished papers, maps, &c., and other special information as to the regions in question. From Sir James Douglas—the highest authority as to the geography of British Columbia—for he has spent nearly half a century there, and most of

the time as its local chief ruler—I received, in recognition of my pamphlet and letters, a note, in warmest terms, of date 3rd April, 1873, from which, as being essentially of public moment and not "private," in its strict sense, I proceed to give the following extracts. As a matter of form I ought, perhaps, to ask his leave, but in the present emergency there is no time for it.

[Extract.]

"Dear Mr. McLeod,—I have had the pleasure, &c." "Your notes and tables of distances [given in much detail in pamphlet] must have been," he says, "of immense service to Mr. Fleming in preparing his last annual report, which, before I received your letter showing how he acquired his information, greatly surprised me by its fulness of detail and evident familiarity with the leading physical features of the country, as well as the breadth and vigor with which it grappled and dealt with the whole subject of the overland route."

"I must certainly add my testimony to that of Mr. Fleming"—(Mr. Fleming had spent some hours with him, in 1872, in his trip from ocean to ocean)—and," he adds, "of many other friends and supporters of the grand Canadian enterprise, as to the extreme importance of your literary contributions in promoting the work." "I retain a lively recollection of your worthy father. It was at 'Isle à la Croix' that I had the pleasure of seeing him, about the year 1821 or '22." "We never met on the west side of the mountains, as he left before I came to the Columbia Department." He then goes on to inform me, in correction of my statement in the pamphlet, that it was *he* saved my father's life from Indians at the Dalles of the Columbia, that it was not *he*, but the celebrated botanist, Douglas.

Of course, I do not pretend that it was from me alone that Mr. Fleming got all such information as could be got only from us old Hudson's Bay and Northwest people, who, in those stirring old times in the far North, travelled much more than they do now, but, up to the time of starting his survey, I do not know from whom *else*, especially as to the interior of British Columbia, he could have got it, save from Governor Sir James Douglas.

I may add—on this point of acknowledgment and approval, in most cases, in marked terms—of my pamphlet, the following authorities:—

The Colonial authorities [Secretary of

State for the Colonies] England—His Excellency the Earl of Dufferin.—His Honor Lieutenant Governor Morris, Manitoba and North West Territories.—The Hon. Hudson's Bay Company, by its Governor and Board of Directors in London—a body not given to such "small-moving," and whose act has, to me, a special value, in that it excuses my apparent violation of much of their traditional esoteric.—The Surveyor General of Dominion Lands [Colonel Dennis].—Mr. Crosby—statistician, and compiler [with much merit] of Lovell's Gazetteer of British North America [a standard work, and in which, under the heads "British Columbia," and "North West Territories," my statements, tabulated, and in descriptive order, as to the economic areas, relatively, of "wheat," and other economic resources, and general geodesy of the whole vast *terrain* in question, are given, in my own words, with due credit, by name, to me, and that with the long list of corroborative authorities consulted on the subject by the compiler.] I might add to the list, the Hon. Mr. Langevin and others. But coming back to the question of route:—

FRAZER BEND TO NORTH ARM, GARDNER'S INLET.

From this Fraser River Bend—a hinging point—say Giscome's Portage, to the north-east corner of the head of the northern arm of the Gardner Inlet, a point determined by Vancouver as Latitude $54^{\circ} 4' N$, Longitude " $231^{\circ} 19'$," as he puts it, (in old style), but which, now, may be stated at $123^{\circ} 41' W$. of Greenwich,—the distance, in air line, is, I estimate, about 240 miles—assuming Giscome Portage (eastern end) at $122^{\circ} 35' W$. Longitude, and, as aforesaid, at $54^{\circ} 25' N$. Latitude.

It is, I believe, available throughout, and without "heavy work" or gradients beyond 20 or at most 30 feet per mile at any point, not even in approaching tide-gate. The course would be to old Fort St. James, 50 miles, West by S. from Fort St. James, thence along the south-side—all fine plain and lake country, almost level—of the North-West Branch of the Fraser—thence along a chain of lakes, known to the old Fur Trade as the Nateotain Lakes to a summit lake—reported as of the same chain—whence by a river marked "Salmon River" in the H. B. Co's. charts, as copied by Arrowsmith—see my map to "Peace River"—the water is represented to flow to the Pacific. I refer to this in my pamphlet, page 105, thus, in giving certain extracts from a work,

citing Chief Factor Harmon's Journal, which journal I had not seen, however, at the time I wrote. Extract—"1812, January 20th, I have returned from visiting five villages of the Nateotains," [Note by Ed. (i. e. myself) "Tribe between Fraser's Lake and crest of the Cascade Range, at the head of Salmon river, which strikes at Hopkins' Point, the head of the northern arm Douglas' channel or canal of Gardner's Inlet] "built," says Harmon, "on a lake which gives origin to a river that falls into Gardner's Inlet. They contain about two thousand inhabitants, who subsist principally on salmon and other small fish, and are well made and robust. The salmon of Lake Nateotain have small scales, while those of Stuart's Lake have none." [Note by Ed. (myself).] "The only solution of the apparent anomaly is that the Nateotain, or Nateotum, as I have seen it elsewhere spelt, salmon is a different kind, probably the powerful *Ekewan*—of which, more anon, which had taken the short cut from the sea to the height, *via* the Salmon River."

In connection with this, in page 99 of my pamphlet, I say, "I refer to all these salmon streams" (speaking of the Skeena, Fraser and the "Salmon River" now in question), "as being, probably, possible highways for man as for the salmon which are found in their source lakes on the very plateau now marched on. No salmon has ever been seen or known to top in its leap fourteen feet in any British stream. Possibly the 'Ekewan' (hereafter described) of our Pacific may, in his special lithe and strength, do more, but certainly not more than a foot or two. These facts are measures, approximate at least, in the question or problem of feasibilities for railway or roadway of some kind from this plateau to the ocean."

The description given in Vancouver's report—page 255 of Mr. Fleming's—represents the point in question at the mouth of the said Salmon River, as one of exceptional features, with a "low valley, three or four miles wide, forming nearly a plain, covered with tall forest trees, mostly of the pine tribe, extending some leagues to where the distant mountains appear to connect the two ranges." There, possibly, may be our *Eureka*; but alas! it is a little too far north for our Grand Trunk Road to China. For home service it would, however, answer well—say for our modern Eldorado—richest in the world

probably—just discovered in northern British Columbia.

Yours,
M. McLEOD.

LETTER VIII.

PEACE RIVER PASS TO NORTH GARDNER'S INLET.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE GAZETTE.

Sir,—The following is my estimate on this head—estimate unavoidably vague, but still based on *some data*, as given in pages 21 to 25, and 96 to 106 in the text of my pamphlet "Peace River," and in pages xii, xiii, xviii and xix of my tables of distances and heights in the same.

Mr. Horetsky (a mere ex-Hudson's Bay clerk, so far as I know, and probably employed by Mr. Fleming for his pedestrian experience as such) not being, it would seem, a railway engineer, nor furnished with any instruments to make any observations—which probably he could not make—in determination of latitude, longitude or distances; and as in what he does give of these last, he varies very little indeed from those given by Sir George Simpson, Mr. McDonald, and myself, and as to *heights*, perfectly accords with me; I may say, although mine were mere calculations from journal entries, in a canoe voyage of over three thousand miles from Hudson's Bay to the mouth of the Fraser—from Ocean to Ocean—and his are, professedly, "aneroid measurements," I am forced to rest on my own data, as reported and given in my "Peace River." Peace River Pass is, as I show in page 90 of my pamphlet, in about Latitude 56° 13'—236 miles north of the Yellow Head Summit.

The following is my estimate of *Railway* route by it:—

| | |
|---|----------------|
| Peace R. Pass to McLeod Fort— continuous average grade 1½ feet per mile..... | 110 miles. |
| McLeod Fort to Foot St. James, undulating, with probable max. gr. 20 feet per mile.. | 80 " |
| Fort St. James to Gardner Inlet North, along South side of N. W. Branch of Fraser, undulating at the beginning and end, but level in middle.... | 210 " |
| | 400 " |
| Add—Nipissing to Red River—(measured) | 973 m. |
| Red River to Peace R. Pass—my estimate. | 1150 m. 2123 " |
| Nipissing (E) to N Gardner Arm, Total..... | 2523 " |

Maximum height, say 7,200 feet above the Sea.

Here, it may be well to give in *justa* relation, the route to the same Pacific point, via the Yellow Head Pass.

| | |
|--|------------|
| Nipissing to Red River—(measured)..... | 973 miles. |
| Red River to Edmonton—(estimated)..... | 750 " |
| Edmonton to Pass [Y H]—(measured)..... | 288 " |
| Summit [Y H] to Cache—(measured)..... | 50 " |
| Cache to N Fraser Bend—(estimated)..... | 180 " |
| Thence to N Gardner Arm—(estimated)..... | 285 " |
| | 2512 " |

Maximum height, 3,746 above the Sea:—

Add for height above that of the Peace R. route—operative equivalent.....

Total..... 2612 "
COMPARATIVE ESTIMATE OF TOTALS.

Yellow Head Route with operative equivalent 2,612 miles.
Peace R. Pass Route..... 2,523 "

Balance in favor of latter, say. 100 "

That is for N. Gardner Arm, but the same might be fairly assumed for the South Arm. The South Arm would be a little nearer, but, on the other hand, the approach to it would, most probably, be considerably higher.

Of the gorges of the Cascade Range, north of the Georgian Gulf, there remains but that—if such there be, as is probable—at the head of the Dean Inlet. I know nothing about it—but would have done so, I think, had it been known to the Fur Trade in those parts; and I have under my hand and possession the best, and perhaps fullest record of the whole history, in all working detail, of the coast trade of the Hon. H. B. Co. from its very initiation. However, I see in Governor Trutch's splendid map of British Columbia the largest river through the range, in those latitudes, marked to the head of Dean Inlet. The head of the inlet is in about 52° 52', and is apparently about 40 miles nearer the N. Fraser Bend than is the N. Gardner Inlet, and is about the same distance as South Gardner Inlet, from that common shunting point. In the Arrowsmith map before me—one used of old, and still, by the H. B. Co. in its work, and constructed from the Company's own charts—there is only a dotted line—signifying unexploration—from

to a point about midway on the trail between old Fort Chilcotin and the head of the North Bentinck Arm. My idea is, that about there, there is a gorge, giving outflow to those "larger" (larger in comparison to the mountain waterfalls immediately in view on the mountain sides) "torrents," which, according to Vancouver, (see report, page 249) "appeared to owe their origin to a more general and "permanent source." He is speaking of the Cascade Canal, near the head of Dean's Inlet, and means, I presume, source inland. The trough of the Dean Inlet gorge is, however, clearly not that of the Gardner Inlet, and is considerably higher, probably averaging 2,500 feet, or rather more, above sea. It certainly should be at once explored, and, in fact, the whole Cascade coast and range, from Bentinck Arm to Naas.

Before leaving them, I would say a word as to these

INLETS AND THEIR NAVIGATION.

All of them—yea, the whole coast of British Columbia, has for three quarters of a century past been the resort—constant resort—in all seasons, of coasting traders, ships, brigs, schooners, and other craft, British, American, Mexican, Russian and others, and I never heard nor read of a wreck on it. And further, I take it upon me to say, that according to the whole world's record of marine disaster, there is, comparatively to its trade and usage, no safer coast anywhere, unlighted though it be. Vancouver's charts and reports—our only best authority yet as to those PARAGES—prove it. For instance as to the "Burke Channel"—first explored by him—and of which the North Bentinck Arm is one of the heads—he thus reports to Her Majesty's Admiralty, see page 245 of Mr. Fleming's report, "May 26th: With a gentle breeze from the E.N.E. we stood" [exploring an unknown sea, with many a rocky wild of isles innumerable] "we stood up Fitzhugh's Sound" [leading into the channel] in the evening, with "all the sail we could spread." The Sound opens to the broad ocean. "This by four "the next morning," he goes on to say, "brought us to the arm leading to Point Menzies, whose extent was left undetermined, and where in a cove on shore, about eight miles without its entrance, I expected to join the Chatham." In the preceding page he speaks also of a remarkably fine cove, large and safe for ships, in the same passage to the Burke Channel but further in, which he designated "Safety Cove," marked also, I perceive, in Lieut. Governor Trutch's

map. Also, we have "Bella Bella," a present snug harbour and trading post, referred to by Mr. Horetzky, and into which the Hudson Bay Company's little trading steamer, in mid-winter, safely bore him. But of those "Pender Rocks" that this gentleman speaks in his book as "obstructing navigation," neither the Trutch map, in its fulness and correctness of the coast of British Columbia, nor Mr. Fleming's report, in its exhaustive fidelity, make any mention. The same kind of mischievous misstatement and blackening, to make some point sinister, is made by this same "dedicator to the Hon. Mr. Mackenzie," as to Bella Coola as a harbour.

The coast, rough and broken though it be—corresponding much with that of Cornwall, Ireland, Scotland and Norway—in fact, their counterpart, but in grander scale, as is the Pacific to the Atlantic, is, to use the words of old "King of Borva" of the Hebrides, "A grand coast for fine harbours." Further—they all open out on the best coaling stations in the world, Fitzburgh Sound having on the one side, north, the Queen Charlotte Islands, with their numerous fine harbours, with coal equal to finest English, and which has sold in San Francisco at \$20 per ton—also good anthracite—and all most abundant and accessible. On the other side, south, is the north-western end of Vancouver Island, with its admirable harbours and excellent coal, abundant and ready to tumble from seam direct into ship's hold, it may be said. To the more northern inlets, such as Gardner's—Vancouver Island is scarce in course to China, it is true, but is so to Australia, the South Pacific, and to San Francisco, and Western Mexico, Central and South America. The Queen Charlotte Islands, in their mineral wealth and fine climate, and abounding fishing grounds, must become, quickly, of first importance. They are worth ten Alaskas.

To Vancouver Island, however, does Providence seem to point for *Rule-Seat* of the Northern Pacific, yea of all the Pacific. An aggregation of remarkable good natural harbours and docks, chiselled out as it were by nature, easily accessible, and having everything required for safety in port, lying just on the great sailing arc the Northern Pacific, according to Maury chart; with the finest of climates for active life; good soil and flora; and coast line low enough for a railway from Victoria to Fort Rupert—a railway which may well be made as part of our Pacific Grand Trunk; it may, and I sincerely hope to yet see it, as a result, sentimental of

my poor father's subscription, (£500 stg.) with others, nearly 40 years ago, to the Puget's Sound Agricultural Association in connection with it, the great entrepôt, the newer London and Liverpool combined of a greater Britain in a wider Ocean. Ships will, it seems to me, not lose time to beat up the Straits of Fuca to the American Railway Terminus up Puget's Sound; easier for them would it be to discharge at Victoria, Barclay Sound, Quatsino Sound, or Port Rupert, and thence may connection be made with both Railway Termini, British and American. From Victoria to Bella Coola is only thirty hours, perhaps only twenty-four hours' steaming.

BUTE AND BURRARD INLETS.

As to the only other Inlets calling for notice, viz., Bute Inlet and Burrard Inlet, I have only one word—a sad one—to say. They *were*, or at least Burrard was our best for railway terminus. Now, both are blocked to us by the guns—*foreign*—of St. Juan!

PEACE RIVER PASS AND OTHER PASSES.

Peace River Pass is thus described in Mr. Horetsky's report as given in Mr. Fleming's, Page 49. "We experienced a very strong current all the way up to the Finlay Branch (70 miles), i.e. 70 miles from the head of the Portage at the east end of this river Pass, and encountered two rapids or falls. From the head of the Portage to within a few miles of the Finlay, the Peace flows through the entire Rocky Mountain range. For 30 or 40 miles from the head of the Rocky Mountain canyon, the valley is encompassed by mountains of not very great altitude, but a little east of the 'Rapide qui ne parle pas,' the main range begins, and the river flows through it for about 25 miles, and until within a few miles of the Finlay Branch, and within this distance, peaks 4,000 and 5,000 feet above the eye, extend back north and south as far as visible."

"The banks within this valley are very rugged. There are gravelly terraces here and there, but steep and projecting rocky points occur at frequent intervals, and in many places the mountains rise up sheer from the river, necessitating," avers Mr. Horetsky, "in the case of road, many deviations and heavy works of construction."

I want to "nail" this statement, Mr. Editor. Captain Butler, the last, and certainly not least, but, with Professor Macoun, the fullest and best authority on this point, thus describes the particu-

lar rocky points in question, of the way. In page 266 of his "Wild North Land," says Butler, "We were now on the mountains. From the low terrace" (N. B. This was on the 8th May, at Spring flood) "along the shore they rose in stupendous masses; their lower ridges clothed in forests of huge spruce, poplar and birch, &c." Page 267. "For two days we journeyed through this vast valley," (i. e. through the range proper, approaching the head of the Pass) "along a wide, beautiful river, tranquil as a lake, and bearing on its bosom, at intervals, small isles of green forest, &c." "Thus we journeyed on. On the evening of the 8th of May we emerged from the Pass."

This description of *impediment* is unfortunate; but in connection with it, it ought to be stated that this same Mr. Horetsky—a subordinate officer, who seems to have ignored his chief, in his duty—has, *primo*, published, in advance of, and forestalling Mr. Fleming's report, a book, being a report of this same expedition in so far as he took part in it. It is "by permission" "dedicated to the Hon. Alexander Mackenzie, Premier, &c.," "by the author."

I refer to the incident as something—I shan't say monstrous—but certainly out of the ordinary course of nature in official life political. Mr. Fleming is our paid Chief Engineer—our servant. As such, at our, the *public's* cost, he employed this subordinate to do certain work, viz: to get and bring to the table of our House of Commons that precious thing, I—as Mr. Fleming so honestly states in his official report—had pointed out—had, as he says, "particularly drawn his attention to," viz: the "solution of the McLeod theory," as honest John Macoun calls it—as to the Peace River Pass—Master subordinate finds it—just as told in my very pages in his hand. It became, then, in ordinary official dealing, a sanctity, to be laid before the people in due course by its delegated high-priest, His Excellency the Governor-General, by the ministry—subordinate still, in a sense of his Minister *ad hoc*. The thing—yet covered in the hands of this subordinate—is taken to Mr. Mackenzie, is offered to him, individually, in a sense. He takes it: abuses it, to the public detriment, and uses it, in a way, to his own sinister ends.

Secundo—This description of *impedimenta* is unfortunate; but in connection with it, it ought to be stated that Mr. Horetsky is himself claimant to the "*trouvaille*"—that, I believe, is the term

used by him, or some one who writes for him—to another: a "better" pass, "probably," as he contends—further South, some 40 or 50 miles, called—by the Indians, for no white man has yet seen it—the "Pine River Pass." Fortunately, his companion, Professor Macoun, who had no such "mare's nest" in his mind's eye, to divert him from the due appreciation of the important physical facts, to specially examine which, and truthfully report thereon, this "Branch Expedition was despatched by Canada's Chief Engineer, gives us, in his most able report, a somewhat different account, thus. Page 97 of Mr. Fleming's report:—"The Peace River valley, *thro' gñ the mountain*" (the italicization is my own; the words are his) "as far as I can judge" (better judge than, so far as I know, one who had never had experience in railway construction) "presents no very serious difficulties to the construction of either a railway or waggon road."

He then describes, at much greater length than Mr. Horetsky, the special features of the Pass and its approaches from the east, facility of bridging, "about eight miles below Hudson Hope, and the road to be carried up the left bank of river all the way through the mountains." "Having passed down the Fraser and over the Nevada," he continues, "since seeing Peace River, I can say *decidedly*" (the italics are Mr. Macoun's) "that there is no comparison between them. The nearest approach to Peace River, in appearance, is that of the Fraser between Fort Hope and Harrison River" (all smooth and open) "where no canons exist, and to give a correct idea of the extent of the" (he) "chief difficulties of the Peace River, I may add they do not extend over more than about 6 miles."

As to snow difficulty, as well as the general features of the Pass, the truth is fairly stated by me, with authorities on page 96 and preceding pages in my pamphlet Peace River. In final citation I give it:

"There is, in fact, no snow difficulty whatever at the Peace River Pass, not even in mid-Winter; the threshold is ever clear as that of an open gateway—ever clean swept by every wind of heaven. It is the most magnificent gateway between the two 'worlds' of this earth, and bears the isotherm of strongest human development. A great Territorial Road [with branches] direct to it, and there striking the centre of a gold region probably the richest in

"the world, would fast people the whole intervening ocean of wheat field."

In this description I am fully borne out, not only by the authorities above stated, but those older authorities, whose position and active interests and life at the time, as leaders in the Fur Trade, forbade attractive coloring to the eyes of the world, of their new pastures; but they were men of truth. In Sir Alexander McKenzie, Sir George Simpson, Chief Factor Harmon, Chief Factor McDonald, [Fur Traders all], I find evidence enough to enable me to say:—Messrs. Macoun and Butler are *decidedly* right, and Mr. Horetsky as decidedly wrong.

So much for routes.

On other branches of this great theme—the scheme as at present laid—its executive and political aspects, and, so-called, "financial basis," I would like to offer a few remarks, but they are scarcely proper to me, in my own name. As to this matter of routes, I had to defend myself, when attacked and almost robbed of my just credit as to the same.

Thanking you for your generous columns,

I am, Mr. Editor,

Yours ever,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, Q., June, 1874.

LETTER IX.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE GAZETTE.

SIR,—The conclusions I arrive at, on the above, are briefly as follows:—

1. That exhaustive survey has determined Mr. Fleming's "Route No. 2," as laid in section sheet 9 of his report, as not only feasible, but as the best possible, in every respect, from Eastern Terminus to the Prairie Region.

2. That in British Columbia, exhaustive survey has proved the necessity of looking to some point North of the Georgian Gulf for a Western Terminus.

3. That a thorough, or at least, sufficient exploration, by competent and reliable men, should be made of all British Columbia, from the Rocky Mountains to the Cascade Range, between latitudes 52° and 57° N., for Railway route.

4. That in the meantime, between Red River and Nipissing Terminus, the work of construction should at once proceed, with all possible energy.

That in British Columbia, the line from,

Victoria to Nanaimo should at once be made.

And that in Manitoba, with like urgency, the Pembina Branch should be "pushed through."

All this may, I presume, at once be begun with the eight millions of dollars, or at least half of that, now being raised in England on the pretension that the great scheme is to be faithfully and earnestly begun and carried out.

INCIDENTAL

to the above is the consideration of "ways and means." This branch of the subject is beyond what I intended to touch on, but, as I have already done so in my Britannicus letters of 1869, in the course of which the editor of the *Ottawa Times* of that day yielding, after controversy, to the force of my argument against alienation of the "Crown Domain" in areas of such extent as to create a predominating class interest to the jeopardy of individual political liberty; and to my argument also that the "Crown Domain"—so called—is a holding merely in trust by this Government for due administration, and only administration, in permanent national behest, happily suggested a system of *hypothecation* of lands to the end sought. Issue about 8 July, 1869—or about then—I have not the precise words. The "idea" struck me with much force, and I really think it is, as matters now are, the most practicable one that has yet been mooted: adopting it, I respectfully conclude,

5thly. That our best North-West and British Columbia lands, to adequate ex-

tent, should be *hypothecated*, and in due course, for settlement, be sold, on terms to attract, and that the proceeds should be appropriated to the establishment of a sinking fund to meet railway debentures.

This, with Imperial aid in fair measure, and a moderate Pacific Railway tax, amply compensated by beneficial returns in a thousand shapes, ought, I humbly think, to be a financial basis that none should complain of.

5thly. But, above all, this great Canadian enterprise must not be made the plaything, or worse, of political parties; but as a work vital to our national existence, must be *honestly* as well as intelligently dealt with; and, moreover, be urged with all our power.

The scheme as at present laid before us, by the present Government, in its executive and financial aspects is, I think, utterly impracticable. In fact, their whole policy, from first to last, in it, has been one really of obstruction, though latterly (probably to raise money in England) they give it seeming countenance. The subterfuge is too transparent for us at home, here. They speak of "selling a charter." There was no sale of charter. But that aside. They, really, are selling not only a railway charter, but *our charter of charters*—that which we acquired at Runnymede; for on this scheme—its success, or its failure—rests, I take it, the question of all British charter right—question of BRITAIN IN AMERICA.

Yours ever faithfully,

M. McLEOD.

Aylmer, June, 1874.